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THE ROLE OF RACE IN JURY IMPARTIALITY AND
VENUE TRANSFERS
DARRYL IL BROWN*
I. INTRODUCrION
A. Two Cases in Point
In 1990, Washington, D.C., Mayor Marion Barry was indicted on
fourteen charges of drug possession and perjury arising from a federal
investigation that yielded a videotape of Barry smoking crack cocaine
in Washington's Vista Hotel.1 Barry and his attorney chose not to seek
a change of venue for the trial, despite overwhelming pretrial public-
ity about the case that included constant replays of the incriminating
videotape on local television stations.2 The jury, drawn from the Dis-
trict and comprised mostly of African Americans,3 convicted Barry, an
African American, of only one misdemeanor possession charge-not
the one arising from the videotape.4 The verdict was generally viewed
as a victory for the defendant.'
* Staff Attorney, University of Georgia School of Law Legal Aid Clinic. B.A., 1984,
East Carolina University, J.D., 1990, University of Virginia School of Law. I want to thank
the participants in the University of Georgia School of Law faculty seminar, at which this
paper was presented, for comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. See Michael York & Tracy Thompson, Bary Guilty on 1 Count, Cleared on 1; Mistrial
Declared on 12 Other Charges: Government Faces Tough Decision Over Whether to Continue Case,
WASH. PosT, Aug. 11, 1990, at Al.
2. See Tracy Thompson & Jill Nelson, Tape Furor Riles Barry Prosecutors: Jury Selection
Moves Slowly in Mayor's Tria WASH. PosT, June 6, 1990, at Al (noting the effect of the
publicity on potential jurors); Saundra Torry, Barry Jurors Eat, Sleep in Shadow of the Law;
Marshals Monitor Panelists'Evey Move, WASH. PosT, July 30, 1990, at Al (noting that the jury
in the Barry trial was sequestered because of publicity).
3. See Steve Twomey & DeNeen Brown, Barry Guilty on 1 Count, Cleared on 1; Mistrial
Declared on 12 Other Charges: Panel Split 6 to 6 on Vista Charges, One Juror Says, WASH. POST,
Aug. 11, 1990, at Al (noting that the majority of the jury was black); Tracy Thompson &
Barton Gellman, Chosen to Sit in Judgment: 12 of 18 on Panel are Black Women, WASH. PoST,
June 19, 1990, at Al (noting that of the 18jurors and alternates in the Barry trial, 15 were
women, 13 were black).
4. SeeTwomey & Brown, supra note 3, at Al (noting that the jury found Barry guilty of
one drug possession charge, found him not guilty of one drug possession charge, and was
hung on the remaining nine drug charges and three perjury charges); see also York &
Thompson, supra note 1, at Al (noting that Barry was not convicted of the charge that was
based on a videotape that showed him smoking crack cocaine).
5. See Keith Harriston, Reaction to Verdict is Another Hung Jury; Regional Response is
Sharply Divided, WASH. Pos-r, Aug. 11, 1990, at A10 (noting that "reactions [to the Barry
verdict] came mostly along racial lines, with blacks generally supporting the mayor and
whites disappointed by the verdict"); Jill Nelson, After the Verdict, Food for Though4 WASH.
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In April 1992, four white Los Angeles police officers were tried in
a California state court on several charges arising from their beating
of a black motorist, Rodney King.6 The defendants had sought and
won a venue change from Los Angeles County on the grounds that
publicity, including a videotape of the beating that had been widely
replayed on Los Angeles television, had prejudiced the vicinage. 7 The
jury from suburban Ventura County, which had no African-American
members,' acquitted the defendants of all charges but one, on which
they could not reach a verdict.'
These two cases"0 raise several important issues about the nature
of impartial juries and the limits of the requirement that the jury rep-
resent a fair cross section of the community and about the role of race
and the venue change procedure in achieving jury impartiality. Both
cases demonstrate that juries representative of their jurisdictions may
nevertheless be homogeneous and unrepresentative of the broader re-
gional or national populace; that such juries can cause public skepti-
cism of the criminal justice system even though they meet Sixth
Amendment requirements;" that the community from which ajury is
PosT, Aug. 11, 1990, at C4 (reporting comments by black Washington citizens who were
generally happy with the verdict).
6. See Lou Cannon & Leef Smith, A Case of Haunting Images and Perplexing Questions;
Jurors Found Videotape 'Appalling'But in the End Believed the Defense, WASH. POST, May 1, 1992,
at A29.
7. See id. (discussing the grant of the defendants' request for a change of venue on
November 26, 1991, to Simi Valley, Ventura County, which has a black population of
1.5%).
8. See id. (noting that the jury was composed of six men and six women, none of
whom were black).
9. See Lou Cannon, National Guard Called to Stem Violence After L.A. Officers' Acquittal in
Beating; Justice Dep't to Review Case, WASH. PosT, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al (noting that three
officers were cleared of all charges, and one officer was found not guilty of all charges
except one, on which the jury was hung).
10. One could add the homicide trial of Miami police officer William Lozano. In 1989,
Lozano fatally shot a black motorcyclist who was fleeing police. The cyclist's passenger was
killed in the resulting crash, and Lozano was convicted of two counts of manslaughter. See
Tony Pugh, A Taut Tallahassee Waits as Lozano Trial Approaches, MiAMi HERALD, Mar. 1, 1993,
at lA. The convictions were overturned, however, after a Florida appeals court concluded
that Lozano should have been granted a change of venue from Miami, where the inci-
dent-and riots sparked in response--garnered much pretrial publicity. Lozano v. State,
584 So. 2d 19, 20-23 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). On remand, the trial was initially trans-
ferred to predominantly white Orlando. In the wake of the verdict in the Rodney King-
beating case, the venue was again changed to Tallahassee, which has a 24% African Ameri-
can population, in an effort to reduce the chances of an all-white jury. See Pugh, supra, at
1A_ Subsequently, the venue was changed yet again, back to Orlando, where a jury of two
Hispanics, one African American, and three non-Hispanic whites acquitted Lozano. See
William Booth, Law Officer is Acquitted in Florida, WASH. Posr, May 29, 1992, at Al.
11. For discussions of the trial of the officers who beat Rodney King, see Cannon &
Smith, supra note 6, at A29 (noting that a large majority of Americans in a Washington
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drawn can substantively affect the verdict; and that defendants employ
the change of venue rules in recognition of these facts.
B. An Overview of the Constitutional Jury Requirements
Under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, criminal de-
fendants have the right to be tried by an impartial jury selected from a
fair cross section of the community.' 2 Defendants also have separate
rights, under Article III of the Constitution and the Sixth Amend-
ment, either to have their trial conducted in the community in which
the crime was committed or to have the trial moved to a different
venue if pretrial publicity or other factors render an impartial jury
improbable in the original venue.'" The intersection of these doc-
trines-further complicated by the Batson doctrine, which protects
and hinders both sides in a criminal case from the use of racially
based peremptory strikes in jury selection14"raises puzzling issues
Post-ABC poll thought that the verdict in the King beating case was wrong); Lynne Duke,
Blacks and Whites Define Word 'Racism' Differently, WASH. PosT, June 8, 1992, at Al (listing
poll results which found that 25% of whites and 78% of blacks thought the verdict "shows
that blacks cannot get justice in this country"); Sue Ann Presley, Case Casts Long Shadow,
WASH. POST, May 1, 1992, at Al (stating that the verdict "raise[s] fundamental questions
about race relations and criminal justice in this country"); DeNeen L. Brown & Pierre
Thomas, In D.C., Some Link Verdict to Racism, Police Power, WASH. PosT, Apr. 30, 1992, at A25
(reporting citizen sentiments such as, "Racism is alive and thriving in this country. This
[King] case symbolizes that.").
For details of the verdict in the trial of Mayor Barry, see Harriston, supra note 5, at AlO
(noting that "reactions [to the verdict] came mostly along racial lines," and reporting that
one (presumably white) citizen stated that the Barry verdict "was a miscarriage of justice"
and that "[t] he jury was obviously poorly selected. They should have had a change of venue
to Dubuque, Iowa"; and quoting one (presumably black) citizen as stating, "[b ] lacks at this
particular time had an opportunity to help a black man, and that's what they did....
[T]hat's justice."); Nelson, supra note 5, at C4 (reporting comments by black citizens that
generally were in favor of the Barry verdict, and discussing it in explicitly racial terms and
with reference to the treatment of blacks by the American justice system).
12. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) ("Selection of a petit jury
from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1988) ("All litigants in
Federal courts entitled to trial byjury shall have the right to grand and petitjuries selected
at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the
court convenes.").
Parties in many civil proceedings, of course, have a right to a jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment. The Seventh Amendment provides in part: "In suits at common law
... the fight of trial by jury shall be preserved...." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Much of the
analysis in this Article may apply to civil juries as well, but the Article will concentrate on
the Sixth Amendment and the criminal context.
13. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (holding that an accused has a Sixth
Amendment right to have his trial in the county where the offense was committed); Rideau
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (holding that a defendant has a right to a change of
venue if extensive publicity prejudices the potential jury pool).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 94-111.
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about the nature of the jury impartiality and collective community
judgment that is guaranteed to the criminal defendant. Central to
those issues is the perpetually thorny problem of the relevance of race
in the criminal justice system.
The underlying presumption of the fair cross section require-
ment is that a defendant's fellow citizens will judge his case fairly and
neutrally only when those citizens represent the entire community
and not simply one segment of it.15 Only through an impartial jury
can a defendant be assured that the case will be determined by the
"commonsense judgment of the community;"" a jury's impartiality,
however, depends upon its representativeness. 17 That presumption,
of course, rests on the idea that members of one racial (or gender)
group in the community think, reason, and judge differently than
members of other groups, and that the outcome of a trial could vary if
it were determined by only one segment of a community-for exam-
ple, only men, or only whites. Consequently, ajury should represent a
balance of distinct segments of the community, including gender,
race, or (though the law is less protective of this basis) socio-economic
class. 18
Restrictions on racially motivated peremptory strikes, arising
from the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Sixth Amendment,
safeguard the rights of both defendants and potential jurors not to
have citizens excluded from juries on the basis of race.19 The line of
cases beginning with Batson v. Kentucky and restricting race-based per-
emptory challenges includes relatively little discussion of race as a fac-
tor in obtaining a fair cross section on the jury panel.20 In fact, in
light of Holland v. Illinois," Batson's contribution to maintaining a fair
cross section on the petit jury is only a secondary purpose of the doc-
trine. Nevertheless, the Batson-Powers-Edmonson-McCollum line of cases
15. See infra notes 28-49 and accompanying text.
16. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
17. See Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HArv. L. REv. 1472,
1586 (1988) [hereinafter Race and the Criminal Process].
18. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (holding unconstitutional the inten-
tional exclusion of jurors based on race).
19. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibiting a prosecutor's racially moti-
vated use of peremptory strikes on the basis of the defendant's Equal Protection right);
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (extending the Batson holding to encompass the po-
tential juror's Equal Protection right not to be peremptorily struck from ajury by a prose-
cutor based on racial bias).
20. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 79; Powers, 499 U.S. at 400; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (applying Batson to the selection ofjuries in civil trials); Geor-
gia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (applying Batson to peremptory strikes exercised
by defendants).
21. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
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shows an underlying substantive preference for racially diverse juries
and implicitly recognizes the effect of excluding a racial group on the
jury's fact finding ability.22
Finally, venue guarantees-and change of venue rules arising
from the Due Process Clause-safeguard a fair jury for the defendant,
but only in a conceptual framework that makes no reference to the
concerns implicated in the fair cross section and peremptory strike
doctrines. Modern change of venue doctrine disregards the composi-
tion of the communities to and from which the trial is being moved
and seeks only to ensure that, regardless of the composition of that
community, the jury pool is sufficiently impartial by virtue of being
untainted by factors such as pretrial publicity, personal acquaintance
with the defendant or victim, or racial prejudice.23 The venue provi-
sions of Article III and the Sixth Amendment guarantee a defendant
that his trial will be held in the jurisdiction that encompasses "the
scene of the crime" and with ajury selected from that locale. 24 Those
guarantees recognize the substantive importance, and distinct charac-
ter, of the judgment of particular communities. The constitutional
provisions resulted from the realization that some communities will
judge defendants differently than others, even if each of the commu-
nities was impartial in the Sixth Amendment sense. These venue pro-
visions recognize the distinction between impartial judgment and the
"commonsense judgment of a community."25
The object of this Article is largely descriptive: to explore the
intersecting concepts of impartiality and "commonsense judgment" in
the context of the overlapping doctrines of vicinage, venue, and fair
cross section. This Article will examine the implications of the ac-
knowledged role race plays injury impartiality and judgment, with the
aim of contributing to a deeper understanding of jury impartiality
than that which often is employed; it will demonstrate that the juris-
prudence of jury impartiality has implicitly rejected a traditional ob-
jectivist notion of fact finding and jury judgment, and instead is
understood better through an antifoundationalist approach to truth
and inquiry.
22. See infra notes 28-49 and accompanying text.
23. Id.
24. "The Trial of all Crimes... shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall
have been committed . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
25. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
1994]
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This Article also will address one prescriptive matter in the doc-
trine of venue change that arises from its analysis. In brief, this Article
argues that Sixth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that juries
can be constitutionally impartial and still reach verdicts very different
from the verdicts that juries of other compositions (i.e., representative
of other communities) would likely reach. The fair cross section, per-
emptory strike, and jury impartiality doctrines acknowledge that dem-
ographic distinctions between venues-especially race-matter in
how jurors view evidence and render a verdict.26 The substantive per-
spective of the jury is likely to change when a trial is moved to a venue
having substantially different racial demographics. Therefore, change
of venue doctrine should take into consideration the demographic
composition of the original and alternative venues and should seek to
find a rough match between the latter and the former. 7
Part II of this Article will examine the jurisprudence of the Sixth
Amendment's fair cross section requirement and its underlying theory
of jury impartiality. Part III will analyze the Batson doctrine's limita-
tions on jury selection and how the implications of that jurisprudence
inform the notion of impartiality. Part IV will look at the venue and
26. See infra text accompanying notes 28-49.
27. One factor criminal actors might calculate is the likely community reaction to their
crime-whether the community will have an understanding of or tolerance for their ac-
tions. Legislators make a similar calculation when they conclude that tougher criminal
laws will have a deterrent effect; they assume that potential offenders assess the risk of
harsher penalties in the jurisdiction and decide to commit their crimes elsewhere, or not at
all. If such thoughts do occur to the criminal actor, then changing the venue of a trial to a
completely different type of community for a reason beyond the defendant's control (such
as the widespread publicity his case may have received in the community) deprives him of
judgment by the community on which his calculations were based and which was the actual
victim of his criminal actions. Cf JoN M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELE CON PROCEDURES: OUR
UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 7 (1977) ("The Constitution thus
firmly established an individual's right to demand the community's sanction-expressed in
the jury's verdict . . ").
However doubtful it may be that offenders make such a calculation before committing
crimes, the Constitution protects that reliance in two separate provisions-Section Two of
Article III and the Sixth Amendment. Many states make the same guarantee. See, e.g.,
State v. Mendoza, 258 N.W.2d 260 (Wis. 1977) (holding that only a defendant may waive
the right to be tried in the venue where the crime was committed). Defendants may be
particularly interested in, and may base the decision to waive venue upon, a comparison of
the racial composition or other demographics of the original venue with those of the
venue to which the case could be transferred. See, e.g., id. at 268 ("[The] defendant...
consciously determined that he wished to be tried by ajury in Milwaukee... [based on] the
desire to have jurors from the same environment in which the crime took place chosen
from a pool having a Mexican-American community.").
Florida recently enacted a statute requiring that, upon a change of venue order, the
trial court must give priority to the alternative county with a demographic composition
closest to the original venue. See 1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 93-225 (West).
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vicinage guarantees of Article III and the Sixth Amendment and at
how the jurisprudence of those provisions acknowledges the connec-
tion between a jury's social origin and the substance of its judgment.
Part V draws on the insights of antifoundationalist theory for a de-
scription of concepts central to the jury-fact finding, interpretation,
truth discovery-and focuses in particular on the salience of race in
jury decisionmaking and factual interpretation generally.
II. THE FAIR CROSS SECTION REQUIREMENT AND JURY IMPARTIALITY
A. Purposes of the Fair Cross Section Requirement
The fair cross section requirement arises from the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee 28 of an impartial jury,29 yet it was not until the 1940s
that the Supreme Court identified "the concept of the jury as a cross-
section of the community."3' It took another two decades for a mean-
ingful doctrine to evolve around that idea and for the Court to articu-
late a conception of an "impartial jury" as a body that fairly represents
the community. 31
28. For an example of a state analog to the Sixth Amendment fair cross section clause,
see Ky. CONST. § 11.
29. "The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means
of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an
impartial one (which it does)." Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990). The Holland
court also explained:
The fair cross section venire requirement is obviously not explicit in this text [of
the Sixth Amendment], but is derived from the traditional understanding of how
an "impartial jury" is assembled. That traditional understanding includes a repre-
sentative venire, so that the jury will be, as we have said, "drawn from a fair cross
section of the community."
Id. (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527 (emphasis added)).
Justice Marshall believed that the fair cross section doctrine arises not from the first
word in the phrase "impartial jury," but from the second. "[ T ] he fair cross section require-
ment is not based on the constitutional demand for impartiality; it is founded on the no-
tion that what is denominated a 'jury' is not a jury' in the eyes of the Constitution unless it
is drawn from a fair cross section of the community." Id. at 814 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942). Two years earlier, the Court stated
for the first time that ajury must be "a body truly representative of the community." Smith
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940); see also Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethink-
ing Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REv. 501, 532-33 (1986).
31. See Akhil R. Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283,
1287-88 (1984) (discussing the older vision of the jury as a nonrepresentative body com-
posed of "handpick[ed] jurors of exemplary moderation and wisdom" and contrasting it
with the modern vision of a body fairly representing all segments of a community).
Whether the cross section requirement serves to facilitate impartiality, or is essential for a
body to be called a "jury" at all, has been a matter of debate on the Court. See Holland, 493
U.S. at 490 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The defendant's right to a fair cross section ofjurors, and the citizens' responsibility
and right to participate injuries, is reiterated in federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1981)
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The fair cross section requirement expanded the concept of jury
impartiality and linked that concept to the jury's diversity and repre-
sentativeness. The fair cross section doctrine presumes a jury is more
likely to be impartial if it is composed of representatives of all seg-
ments and groups of the community, who together create a body ca-
pable of exercising the central ideal of the doctrine-"the
commonsense judgment of the community. "3' Bringing such judg-
ment to bear is not possible "if the jury pool is made up of only special
segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded
from the pool.""3 "When any large and identifiable segment of the
community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from
the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human expe-
rience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable."34
(explaining that the Jury Selection and Service Act is based on the "policy of the United
States" that an accused faces a jury from a "fair cross section of the community" and that
"all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit
juries").
32. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972); Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); VAN DYKE, supra note 27, at 9 (The "jury's legitimacy has
always rested in its capacity to express fairly the community's conscience."). See generally
G.K. CHESTERTON, TREMENDOUS TuFaEs 55-59 (1930).
[T] he horrible thing about all legal officials, even the best, about all judges,
magistrates, barristers .... is simply that they have got used to it.
Our civilization has decided, and very justly decided, that determining the
guilt or innocence of men is a thing too important to be trusted to trained men.
It wishes for light upon that awful matter, it asks [people] who know no more law
than I know, but who can feel the things that I felt in the jury box.... [Wihenit
wishes anything done which is really serious, it collects twelve of the ordinary
[people] standing round.
Id. at 58-59.
The other major function of the fair cross section doctrine serves the appearance of
justice: the public will be more likely to retain confidence in the justice system if it sees
that the system is overseen by all segments of the community. Thus, unrepresentative jury
pools "create the appearance of bias in the decision of individual cases, and they increase
the risk of actual bias as well." Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (Marshall,J., plural-
ity opinion).
One should note that the fair cross section doctrine does draw its justification from
the jury's primary task as that task is ordinarily described-to examine evidence, reach
factual conclusions, and determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. The fair
cross section rule ensures that a jury can perform the larger social function of serving as a
democratic check on the criminal process and its professional players. Taylor, 419 U.S. at
530.
33. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
34. Peters, 407 U.S. at 503. See also Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 183 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[O]ne cannot have confident knowledge of influences that
may play and prey unconsciously upon [jurors'] judgment."); Massaro, supra note 30, at
545-46.
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The Supreme Court has recognized that impartiality is not simply
a matter of juror bias, narrowly defined and traditionally understood
as some pretrial information about the case or acquaintance with the
parties; nor is it simply a function of weeding out biased jurors
(through voir dire, challenges for cause, and peremptory strikes) and
keeping neutral ones. The fair cross section doctrine acknowledges
thatjury impartiality and judgment are products of a much more com-
plex phenomenon than is accounted for in the ordinary concept of
bias.3 5
The fair cross section doctrine also reinvigorated a secondary
purpose of jury impartiality. The jury not only must engage in fact
finding and guilt determination, 6 which itself is a complicated and
subtle task," but also must exercise a form of community judgment
that is essential to prevent government abuse of power.3" The fair
cross section doctrine renewed an emphasis on the jury's function of
serving as a democratic check on the government actors who run the
criminal justice system-that is, on the judges, prosecutors, and po-
lice.3 9 The doctrine "'guard [s] against the exercise of arbitrary power'
and ensure[s] that the 'commonsense judgment of the community'
35. See Massaro, supra note 30, at 545-47; see also supra notes 28-33 and accompanying
text.
36. SeeJohnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373 (1972) (noting that the right to "trial by
jury derives from the special confidence we repose in a 'body of one's peers to determine
guilt or innocence as a safeguard against arbitrary law enforcement'") (quoting Williams,
399 U.S. at 87); Massaro, supra note 30, at 510-11.
37. See infra notes 170-195 and accompanying text.
38. See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 373 (noting that the jury serves "'as a safeguard against
arbitrary law enforcement'") (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 87); Williams, 399 U.S. at 100
(observing that the purpose of the jury is "to prevent oppression by the Government").
Although the social or political role of the jury as an element of democratic govern-
ment often has been cited as a central purpose of the institution, courts have always identi-
fied the primary function of the jury as protection of the defendant. See Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). According to the Patton Court:
The record of English and colonial jurisprudence antedating the Constitution
will be searched in vain for evidence that trial by jury in criminal cases was re-
garded as part of the structure of government, as distinguished from a right or
privilege . . . bestowed upon the person accused of crime for the purpose of
safeguarding him against the oppressive power of the King and the arbitrary or
partial judgment of the court.
Id at 296-97.
Moreover, the ultimate purpose of the jury is usually described as truth discovery, see
infra notes 170-171 and accompanying text, which subsumes the goal of stopping govern-
ment oppression inasmuch as punishment of the defendant based on inaccurate allega-
tions would be oppressive in itself.
39. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (stating that juries protect against
an "overzealous or mistaken prosecutor" or "perhaps [the] overconditioned or biased re-
sponse of a judge").
1994]
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will act as 'a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor, "'40
and against the "'compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."'4a The doc-
trine suggests that community judgment, realized through debate
among subgroups, will not share the prejudices and jaded perspec-
tives of prosecutors or judges.4 2
The Supreme Court also has explained that the fair cross section
requirement is important to "preserv[ing] 'public confidence in the
fairness of the criminal justice system,' and ... implement[ing] our
belief that 'sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic
responsibility."'43 Applying such a rationale signals the Court's adop-
tion of a revised understanding of impartiality. Formerly, to satisfy the
goal of impartiality was to empanel twelve people of integrity, good
character, and trusted judgment-an intentionally nonrepresentative
group of a community's best citizens." But both the Court and the
public whose confidence it seeks to maintain gradually have reached a
new understanding of impartiality that encompasses the community's
collective judgment.45 Juries composed of "leading" citizens under-
represented many groups in the community and came to be recog-
nized as holding particular, but not neutral, viewpoints.4 6
The fair cross section doctrine recognizes that communities com-
prise nonfungible subgroups, each of whose judgment is distinct and
may not match the judgment of the whole.47 It rejects the idea that an
unbiased individual who acts objectively and in good faith can be a
neutral arbiter, fungible with any other, regardless of social origins,
and instead acknowledges that individuals are distinguishable by their
40. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174-75 (1986) (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530).
41. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 373 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
42. See Massaro, supra note 30, at 508-10.
43. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174-75 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31, in turn quoting
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
44. This is the premise of the "key man" system ofjury selection, in which one upstand-
ing citizen is designated to select a group of similarly qualified citizens to serve as jurors.
See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (describing the Texas "key man" jury selec-
tion system).
45. Id. at 492-501 (holding that the Texas "key man" jury selection system constituted
prima facie discrimination in jury selection).
46. Id.
47. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972) (acknowledging that groups
within a community have distinctive viewpoints that their members will represent when
serving on juries: "We also cannot accept. . . that minority groups... will not adequately
represent the viewpoint of those groups simply because they may be outvoted in the final
result"); Johnson, 406 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (objecting to the fact that a
nonunanimous jury verdict permits jurors to "ignore the views of fellow panel members of
a different race or class").
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group affiliations or social history.4" Twelve white men with neither
connection to a case or discernable bias nevertheless are likely to
reach different conclusions than twelve similarly unconnected, unbi-
ased black women. Impartiality and community judgment, therefore,
are achieved through debate among all the community's subgroups.49
B. Defining the Community and the Problem of Diversity
The fair cross section doctrine emphasizes the need for diverse
viewpoints on a jury and to some extent presumes a diverse commu-
nity5" in which there are subgroups that can inform each other's per-
spectives and judgments. 1 Yet the Court has never examined the
definitions or boundaries of communities that are utilized by state and
federal courts, even though those boundaries are a fundamental de-
terminant of a community's diversity.52 Judicial districts have never
had to meet any standard analogous to that which the Voting Rights
Act imposes on legislative districts,5" although it is conceivable-if
48. Even ifjudges did not become "overconditioned or biased," Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530,
and even if communityjudgment were not the normative preference, the social and group
differences among individuals would justify a preference for juries over single judges.
49. See Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 515 (Mass.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881
(1979); Massaro, supra note 30, at 518, 54849 n.230.
Note, however, that if ajury were required to represent all community subgroups, and
if no other criteria were available to define a "fair jury," then the cross section rule actually
could harm the defendant because jurors known to be hostile to the defendant's racial
group would have to be represented on the jury anyway. See id. at 547.
50. The term "community" as used in the fair cross section doctrine refers to the same
population locus that the terms venue and vicinage refers to in other doctrines. While
venue technically refers to the geographic area in which a trial is conducted, change of
venue rules really are concerned with the population of potential jurors in a venue; that is,
with the vicinage. Each of these terms is used to refer to the population base from which a
jury will be selected (usually the population of a county or judicial district).
51. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
52. See Stanton D. Krauss, Representing the Community: A Look at the Selection Process in
Obscenity Cases and Capital Sentencing, 64 IND. L.J. 617, 632-33 & nn. 68-71 (1989) (observing
that, in obscenity cases, the Supreme Court has left open the question of whether the
community that the jury represents is statewide, nationwide, coextensive with the vicinage,
or defined by some other boundary); Steven I. Friedland, Race, Rap and the Community
Standards Test of Obscenity: The Community of Culture, 15 NOVA L. REv. 119, 123-24 (1991).
53. It is interesting to contrast the method used in drawing judicial jurisdictional
boundaries with that used to create state and federal legislative districts. Judicial bounda-
ries are drawn without regard to the populations they define, and yet once the boundaries
are set, the Constitution assumes that jury pools drawn from the districts will well represent
their populations. Legislative districts, on the other hand, are drawn (and redrawn period-
ically) explicitly with the goal of population representation in mind, as mandated by the
Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. Each voting district is designed not to be a diverse
community within itself, as would be ideal with jury venues, but rather so that representa-
tives from all the districts will combine to form a "fair cross section" in the legislature or in
Congress.
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burdensome-that judicial districts could be redrawn periodically to
maximize demographic diversity.54
Criminal law has always been administered predominantly at the
local or regional level;5 5 many communities defined by traditional
political boundaries (usually county or city limits) lack large and iden-
tifiable subgroups of the national community,"b however, and local
populations often share a comparatively limited variety of human ex-
periences.57 Many counties, cities and federal districts are not racially
diverse. Even if jury pools perfectly represent the local community,
they still may be "made up of only special segments of the [larger,
national] populace,"58 and as a result, "large, distinctive groups are
excluded from the pool."59
Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that the fair cross
section rule does not require representative petit juries.6 ° The doc-
trine provides only a guarantee that the procedures for creating ajury
pool are designed to yield a fair cross section of the predefined local
54. It should be noted that such a project is not necessarily infeasible even if it would
be somewhat burdensome. Legislative districts (and now judicial election districts as well)
must be redrawn every ten years. For legislative districts, the aim usually is to give particu-
lar racial groups dominance within the appropriate districts. Conversely, the goal for the
judicial districts would be to make each district more diverse. The task would be compli-
cated by the fact that judicial districts usually maintain separate court records, and reorga-
nizing the records with each redistricting might prove to be an administrative nightmare.
But the project may not be impossible: perhaps vicinages (districts used solely for jury
selection purposes) could be separated from the judicial districts designed for administra-
tive purposes.
55. DAVlDJ. BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN HISTORY 8,
61-62 (1992); cf Rex v. Harris, 97 Eng. Rep. 858, 859 (K.B. 1762) (discussing change of
venue among "counties"); Comment, Multi-Venue and Obscenity Statutes, 115 U. PA. L. REv.
399, 406 (1967) [hereinafter Multi-Venue].
56. Few would demand that jury pools represent the national demographic mix, but
courts sometimes have expected juries to discover and then reflect the sentiments of a
national community. See Krauss, supra note 52; Multi-Venue, supra note 55.
57. At the same time, judicial districts are no more likely to encompass a diversity of
culture or experience. In federal courts, the "community" usually consists of the federal
judicial district or one of its divisions, and it frequently is designed with little apparent
reference to demographic patterns or state political subdivisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 1863
(1988); Drew Kershen, Vicinage, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 101-17 (1977) [hereinafter Kershen,
Vicinage I].
58. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); see also Massaro, supra note 30, at 547
(observing that a true "cross section of the 'community' could be a totally homogeneous
group" known to be hostile toward a defendant's racial group).
59. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
60. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-74 (1986) (holding that the fair cross
section doctrine does not guarantee representative petit juries due to the "practical impos-
sibility" of a "truly 'representative' petite jury" in every case) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986)).
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community.6' At two points in the process then-defining the vici-
nage and selecting the petit jury from a venire-the Sixth Amend-
ment provides no protection against a nondiverse jury.62 Juries
representative of homogeneous communities still lack certain "vari-
eties of human experience;"63 when any one cognizable group is ab-
sent, "a flavor, a distinct quality is lost."' Failure to provide more
protection for the representativeness of petit juries further undercuts
the fair cross section doctrine's ability to achieve its two main goals:
permitting a diverse populace to render an impartial judgment result-
ing from debate among its subgroups, and maintaining public faith in
the criminal justice system.65 The latter goal is at risk because a jury
fairly representative of its vicinage nevertheless may look unrepresent-
ative to a broader, more diverse populace. The Barry trial and the
Rodney King beating trial are prime examples: both verdicts met with
speculation and public criticism centering on the racial homogeneity
of their juries, even though both juries fairly represented the relevant
vicinage.66
One explanation for the incomplete remedy that Sixth Amend-
ment doctrine affords is that the goal of a judgment rendered by a
representative group of jurors comes into tension with a separate
value of the criminal law: local administration of criminal justice.
The fact that criminal judgments reflect the particular perspectives of
a community enables the community to tailor its criminal law (and
thus, to some extent, its social life as well) in accord with local prefer-
61. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530; Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972) ("All that
the Constitution forbids ... is systematic exclusion of identifiable segments of the commu-
nity from jury panels."); see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965) ("Neither the
jury roll nor the venire need be a perfect mirror of the community or accurately reflect the
proportionate strength of every identifiable group."), overruled &y Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990) (holding that the petit jury
must be "'drawn from a fair cross section of the community.'") (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at
527). That is why the doctrine is sometimes termed the "fair cross section venire require-
ment." Holland, 494 U.S. at 480; see Massaro, supra note 30, at 534.
62. See Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 17, at 1585-87.
63. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972).
64. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 194 (1946). The Court used this phrase in
the context of the exclusion of women from jury pools, but has never given any indication
that the same result does not follow from the exclusion of racial or ethnic groups as well.
Cf Peters, 407 U.S. at 504 (citing Ballard in a case involving exclusion of African Americans
from jury pools).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 43, 49.
66. See supra note 11. The same fear of public hostility to a verdict rendered by a
largely white jury prompted the move of the William Lozano trial from mostly white Or-
lando to the more racially mixed city of Tallahassee, Florida. See Pugh, supra note 10, at
IA.
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ences.6 7 Localized decisionmaking in criminal matters serves the val-
ues of community autonomy, regional and cultural diversity, and
federalism.6" Just as states and localities can adopt different criminal
laws reflecting the consensus of their populace-defining and regulat-
ing obscenity,6 9 banning alcohol sales, 70 or imposing the death pen-
alty7 1-so too juries can interpret and enforce laws (and assess the
actions of their prosecutors, judges and police) according to local
preferences. 72 The benefit of local justice administration is the flip
side of the value we place on diverse juries.7' Local preferences can
be valuable precisely because they represent the views of a particular
subgroup untempered by input from other perspectives. 4
67. BODENHAMER, supra note 55, at 8, 61-62, 66.
68. See Multi-Venue, supra note 55, at 406 (quoting MArrLAND, THE CONSrrrUTIONAL His-
TORY OF ENGLAND 141 (1941)).
69. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (Warren, CJ., concurring) (not-
ing that in the context of obscenity, the same material may be judged differently "accord-
ing to the part of the community it reached").
70. See Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939) (holding that States have absolute
power under the Twenty-First Amendment to prohibit the sale of alcohol within their
boundaries).
71. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (concluding that the Court has estab-
lished limitations on the death penalty where the community has reached a consensus that
the death penalty was disproportionate in relation to certain classes of crimes).
72. That juries should be able to follow community preference was one of the explicit
concerns when the Sixth Amendment jury trial and vicinage provisions were drafted. See
infra text accompanying notes 156-169.
73. In the abstract, we probably worry more about the potentially unjust outcomes of
local, nondiverse juries than we do about the loss of local autonomy resulting from the
imposition of broader diversity in jury pools. Illustrations of the worst case scenarios in-
clude all-white juries convicting innocent black defendants, or freeing guilty white defend-
ants, due to racial prejudice. But the use of nondiverse juries also can empower
communities to administer their criminal justice system in an arguably even more direct
manner. For instance, a liberal county in a state that has authorized capital punishment
might produce juries that never impose the death penalty, even for crimes that would carry
a death sentence elsewhere in the same state. As in Mayor Marion Barry's trial on drug
charges, a local jury also can refuse to convict a defendant in order to protest tactics of the
police and prosecutors-which is precisely the role of checking governmental abuse of
power that juries are supposed to play.
74. As discussed below, the value our system places on community diversity and auton-
omy, as reflected in the recognition that juries from different communities decide cases
differently, also creates a difficulty in applying change of venue doctrine. If local commu-
nities are truly distinct, then transferring a case from one venue to another necessarily
changes not only the type of community that will render the verdict but also the substan-
tive normative judgment the defendant will face. This change can have a greater effect on
the outcome of the trial than the prejudice from pretrial publicity that the venue transfer
seeks to remedy, as trial attorneys have always known.
120
RACE AND VENUE
C. Judgment and Varieties of Bias
The fair cross section doctrine acknowledges that jury bias can
result solely from the social origin or position of its members,7 5 re-
gardless of their good faith or lack of pretrial knowledge about the
case theyjudge. Bias therefore can be divided into at least two types.76
The first, specific bias, is a reaction to the particular case at hand:
perhaps a juror personally knows the defendant, the victim, or a par-
ticipating attorney, or has been prejudiced by pretrial publicity. Bias
from pretrial publicity has been the focus of most Supreme Court case
law on impartial juries.77 This first form of bias is addressed by the
traditional judicial mechanisms of voir dire, challenges for cause, per-
emptory strikes, sequestration of the jury, limitations on publicity, and
change of venue; it is this conception of bias that dominates discus-
sions concerning jury impartiality in the case law and literature.7"
The second type of bias can be termed general bias or-perhaps
better for this discussion-interpretive bias.79 This form of bias arises
from the composition of the jury and from the varying perspectives
that jurors bring to the court even without any specific knowledge of
or connection to the case. Jury interpretive bias is important because
75. This Article uses "social origin" broadly to include race and gender, because those
distinctions, in the context of American cultural history (and the West's generally), inevita-
bly affect every person's social life.
76. The Court seemed to make this distinction in Taylor v. Louisiana:
Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the
community as well as impartial in a specific case.... [T] he broad representative
character of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance of a diffused im-
partiality and partly because sharing in the administration ofjustice is a phase of
civic responsibility.
Taylor, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
77. See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984) (finding that even a four-year time
lapse between adverse publicity and respondent's second trial resulted in an impartial
jury); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) (holding that although there was extensive
pretrial media coverage of petitioner's case, petitioner failed to prove it had resulted in a
constitutionally unfair trial); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (concluding that
the "massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity" prevented petitioner from receiving a fair
trial); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (holding that the televising of the trial was inher-
ently prejudicial and thus a denial of due process); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963) (holding that the televised interrogation and subsequent confession of the peti-
tioner resulted in "Kangaroo court proceedings" that denied petitioner due process of
law).
78. See, e.g., RITA J. SIMON, THE JURY- Irs ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 109-21 (1980)
(discussing the impact of pretrial publicity on the jury); Massaro, supra note 30, at 543.
79. General or interpretive bias is used here to refer to the same thing for which Hans-
Georg Gadamer employed the term "prejudice." See infra notes 184-186 and accompanying
text. Neither prejudice nor bias in this usage is employed in a negative sense; rather, they
refer to a person's inevitably partial and contextualized perspective.
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the exercise of juror judgment entails interpretation and assessment
of facts, evidence, witness demeanor, and even law.8 ° Such interpre-
tive (and intuitive) analysis by jurors is more likely to be a product of
their life experiences than of any bias arising from specific knowledge
about the defendant's case."1 What is at issue in a discussion of gen-
eral or interpretive bias among jurors is the differences in their intui-
tion, common sense, and deep-seated hunches and judgments about
social life" 2-the type of differences in perspective that often arise
from differences in race or gender. It is this form of bias, or interpre-
tive perspective, that is the concern of the fair cross section doctrine.
If the jury does not represent a fair cross section of the community,
then the defendant may be judged from the perspective of only a lim-
ited segment of the community; because the experience or perspec-
tive of that group is distinctive, judging the defendant in those terms
alone and without the contribution of the remainder of the commu-
nity constitutes impermissible bias. 3 The fair cross section require-
ment guards against such partiality.84
80. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 22-23 (1983) (discussing the "interpretive
operations" in an "ideal juror analysis" according to the "story model" of ajuror's cognitive
processing, which includes "creating an interpretive context for the actions at the center of
the story through inferences" and "evaluating the interpretation against social frames to
determine the degree of internal consistency and descriptive accuracy"); Ronald J. Allen,
Unexplored Aspects of the Theory of the Right to Trial by Jury, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 33, 37 (1988)
("[J]urors' experience and perspectives are crucial variables in determining the effect of
the words that a witness speaks at trial.").
81. See, e.g., VAN DYIKE, supra note 27, at 18 ("UJ]urors bring to the jury box prejudice
and perspectives gained from their lifetimes of experience"; overall, however, a random
mix of jurors "will be impartial in the sense that they will reflect the range of the commu-
nity's attitudes."); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761 (Cal. 1978) (explaining that the
fair cross section doctrine serves to "achieve an overall impartiality by allowing the interac-
tion of the diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from their group experiences").
82. For a further elaboration of this idea, see infra text accompanying notes 178-195.
83. Justice Frankfurter recognized that over-representation of particular juror perspec-
tives would result in jury partiality and urged that the "[b ] road, representative character of
the jury should be maintained, partly as an assurance of diffuse impartiality .... " Thiel v.
Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) quoted in Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). The idea of "diffused impartiality" acknowledges that
impartiality is achieved by balancing the diverse perspectives of a variety of jurors and that
such a balance requires a representative panel.
84. SeeVAN DvKE, supra note 27, at 12 ("The justification for ajury representing a cross-
section of the community is instead the realization that people do have their own perspec-
tives-based on their different lives-and that only by balancing these perspectives can we
hope to achieve impartiality. Including a fair cross section is the best way of protecting the
jury's integrity."); id. at 16-17 (quoting testimony of Judge Irving Kaufman, head of the
committee on the operation of the justice system, at hearings regarding the Jury Service
and Selection Act of 1968). Van Dyke adds:
Because all people have their prejudices, and the jury is not a scientific instru-
ment, it cannot be guaranteed that bias will not play a part. But the best way to
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Because general bias affects the intellectual basis for acts of assess-
ment or judgment, it determines the form and effect of specific bias;
conceptually, general bias precedes specific bias. More particularly,
the effect that pretrial publicity has on a potential juror-whether it
will incline her for or against the defendant, or have no effect 5 -
depends on the general perspective bias through which the juror fil-
ters and interprets the publicity. The case of Mayor Barry provides a
perfect example of this interpretive filter. The pretrial publicity in
that case included a videotape of Barry smoking crack cocaine in a
hotel room, to which he was lured by a sometime girlfriend who was
cooperating with federal investigators. A common effect of that video-
tape on white citizens of Washington, D.C., was that it led them to
conclude that Barry was "caught red-handed" and was indisputably
guilty."6 On the other hand, many black citizens saw in that same
video a black public official entrapped by white agents, a man who
deserved more empathy than blame.8 7 Each group developed a spe-
cific bias from its exposure to the pretrial publicity, but that specific
bias varied greatly depending upon the observers' different interpre-
tive perspectives.
Jurors serve as the community's representatives. There are com-
peting conceptions of how they fulfill that function, but the interpre-
tive bias that is the concern of the fair cross section doctrine is a
central attribute of each juror. One might understand jurors to act as
"free agents"8" following the model of capital juries, on which each
member is to render judgment based upon her own conscience ac-
cording to the assumption that twelve impartial and properly selected
jurors collectively will represent and "express the conscience of the
community." 9 Alternatively, one can apply the model ofjurors in ob-
minimize bias is to impanel a representative cross-section of the community; with-
out such a cross-section, doubts about the jury's partiality will persist.
Id. at 45. See also Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 515 (Mass.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 881 (1979) (stating that diversity of opinion among individuals, "some of whose con-
cepts may well have been influenced by their group affiliations," is what the court envisions
when referring to "diffused impartiality").
85. SIMON, supra note 78, at 110-13 (discussing the effects of publicity and public opin-
ion on jurors).
86. See Harriston, supra note 5, at A1O.
87. See id.
88. The phrase, in this context, is Professor Krauss's. See Krauss, supra note 52, at 617-
18, 625-32.
89. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968); Krauss, supra note 52, at 617-18,
625-32 (defining "community conscience").
It is essential to the proper function of this "free agent" paradigm that the jury be a
representative cross section of the community; a group of twelve from one subgroup will
have a localized general bias or perspective that in effect will be a different conscience
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scenity cases, in which the jurors are to function as the community's
"delegates."90 That is, rather than being free agents, jurors are the
delegates of the community, and must carry out its collective judg-
ment even if particular jurors disagree with it.a" In the "delegate"
model, the twelve individual jurors are each bound to vote as they
believe the collective community would, and the purpose of requiring
a cross section of the community is to give jurors varying perspectives
on how to define the collective community sentiment that each will be
obligated to follow." Regardless of how the juror's task is con-
ceived-or how the jury is instructed to perform its task 93-the inevi-
tability of interpretive bias remains fundamental to an understanding
of jury decisionmaking.
III. LIMITATIONS ON JURY SELECTION TACTIcs
A. Race-Based Peremptory Strikes and Jury Composition
Fair cross section doctrine played no part in the series of
Supreme Court decisions9 4 that ostensibly limits parties' abilities to
change the racial composition of petitjuries. Beginning with Batson v.
from the community's broad-based, nonlocalized perspective. Not only will other perspec-
tives not be represented, but the subgroup on the jury will not have their views informed,
and perhaps changed, by input from other subgroups' perspectives. This model thus has
difficulties in light of the Sixth Amendment's relatively weak guarantee that the petit jury
actually will be a cross section of the community.
90. Krauss, supra note 52, at 618, 632-42 (demonstrating the difficulty ajuror may have
in determining community standards or public opinion).
91. Id. at 641.
92. The supposition of a single, ascertainable "community sentiment" has always been
problematic. One difficultly is what to do when there is no community standard because
the community is so divided that no consensus exists. Does a view shared by 51% of the
populace constitute a standard, or must the consensus be much broader? See Roderick A.
Bell, Determining Community Standards, 63 A.B.A. J. 1202 (1977); J. Steven Beckett &
Roderick A. Bell, Community Standards and Admitting a Public Opinion Poll into Evidence in an
Obscenity Case, 84 CASE & COM. 18, 23 (Mar.-Apr. 1979). Moreover, assessments of such an
abstract construct as a "community standard" are likely to vary, and interpretive biases will
underlie any such judgment. For an argument that a unified, coherent community senti-
ment does not exist in many contemporary geographical areas and that the concept of a
community defined by geography is outdated and instead should be defined by nonge-
ographical considerations such as a shared culture, see Friedland, supra note 52, at 132-57.
93. Capital and obscenity cases represent particularly "constitutionalized" areas of
criminal law; consequently, the model for jury behavior in more routine criminal cases has
not been authoritatively dictated. For instance, some standard jury instructions are closer
to the capital jury model, directing jurors to render a verdict in line with their own con-
sciences or convictions after deliberating with an open mind and considering other views.
See, e.g., 2 GEORGIA SUGGESTED PAI'ERN JURY INSTRUCTIONs 20 (1984).
94. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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Kentucky, the Court strengthened a constitutional limitation on both
prosecutors95 and defendants96 (as well as civil litigants97 ) that prohib-
its them from exercising their peremptory strikes during voir dire for
racially discriminatory reasons. The restriction on racially motivated
peremptory strikes arises from the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause,98 not from the Sixth Amendment.99 Nevertheless,
some of the concerns articulated by the Court in Batson are essentially
fair cross section concerns. The Court relied, in part, on cases de-
cided under the Sixth Amendment 00 and stated that permitting ra-
cially biased peremptory strikes could serve to deny the defendant
"the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure"-a panel of
"'peers or equals ... , that is, of his neighbors, fellows, [and] associ-
ates,"' who will serve as a safeguard "against the arbitrary exercise of
power by prosecutor or judge."'0 1 In Allen v. Hardy,'0 2 the Court de-
scribed Batson as establishing a new rule that "serv[es] a criminal de-
fendant's interest in neutral jury selection procedures" and that "may
have some bearing on the truthfinding function of a criminal trial." 0 3
Moreover, in Powers v. Ohio," 4 the Court concluded that defendants
suffer cognizable injury from race-based peremptory strikes because
such strikes "place[ ] the fairness of a criminal proceeding in
95. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-88.
96. See McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359.
97. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2080.
98. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86, 89, 97.
99. See Holland, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not gov-
ern the use of peremptory strikes).
In Batson, the defendant originally raised both Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment ob-
jections to the prosecutor's racially motivated peremptory strikes in his trial, relying on
both the Sixth Amendment fair cross section requirement and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Equal Protection Clauses. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 83. The Batson Court ignored the
Sixth Amendment claim, however, and based its ruling exclusively on the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 89.
100. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 & n.8 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968);
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)).
101. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
(1880)).
102. 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
103. Id. at 259. The Court also described Batson as "protect[ing] a defendant's interest
in a neutral factfinder." Id. See generally ALFREDO GARcIA, THE SlxTH AMENDMENT IN MOD-
ERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: A CRTICAL PERSPECTIVE 197 (1992) (analyzing the doctrinal
development of the Sixth Amendment by concentrating on the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation since the 1960s). Furthermore, the Allen Court noted that Batson served other func-
tions, namely, to ensure "that States do not discriminate against citizens who are
summoned to sit in judgment against a member of their own race," and to "strengthen[1
public confidence in the administration ofjustice." Allen, 478 U.S. at 259.
104. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
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doubt."1"5 The Batson prohibition on race-based peremptory strikes,
therefore, serves not only the antidiscrimination purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause, but also the Sixth Amendment goal of providing
the criminal defendant with an impartial fact finder-in the form of a
jury whose impartiality is safeguarded by its racial diversity.
Notwithstanding such judicial acknowledgements that a jury's
composition can substantively affect its decisions, the law governing
peremptory challenges, like the fair cross section doctrine,1" 6 is at bot-
tom a procedural protection rather than a substantive guarantee. 0 7
That is, Batson and its progeny purport to provide protection against
racial prejudice when such prejudice serves as the basis for striking
jurors. But the ban on race-based peremptory challenges, like the fair
cross section requirement, gives neither party a right to a particular
jury composition. Neither doctrine guarantees a substantive outcome
105. Id at 411. The Court stated further that racial discrimination in jury selection
"damages both the fact and the perception" of the jury serving as a "vital check against the
wrongful exercise of power by the State." Id. When the jury is picked in a discriminatory
manner, questions arise about whether the "jury [was] free from ethnic, racial, or political
prejudice" or had a "predisposition about the defendant's culpability," id. (quoting
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981)), and about whether "a verdict of
conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with the law by persons who are fair." Powers,
499 U.S. at 413. See also GARctA, supra note 103, at 199.
106. See supra notes 28-49 and accompanying text.
107. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-87 ("[T]he defendant does have the right to be tried by a
jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria," id. at 85-86; and
"[t] hose on the venire must be 'indifferently chosen.'" Id at 87 (quoting Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880))); see also Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 17, at
1585 ("The Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment as giving a right to a nondiscrimi-
natory selection process rather than a right to a jury of a particular composition.").
Thus, under Batson, an all-white jury still may result from a multiracial jury pool, as
long as the parties can articulate nonracial reasons for the use of their peremptory strikes.
Cf Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Any prosecutor can easily assert
facially neutral reasons for striking ajuror.... ."). Under the fair cross section cases, an all-
white jury pool is not improper so long as the procedures used for selecting the jury pool
were nondiscriminatory. Both doctrines promote the goal of diverse juries by attempting
to control only certain factors: racially biased peremptory strikes (the Batson doctrine), or
venire selection procedures (the fair cross section doctrine). See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975) (requiring that a petit jury be selected from a representative cross section
of the community, which includes women); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (hold-
ing that the exclusion of women from venires violates the fair cross section requirement).
Other factors contributing to unrepresentative juries-including the factor of chance-
remain uncontrolled. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 499 (1990) (noting that public
confidence is not undermined if a jury is unrepresentative due to "the operations of
chance," or "the luck of the draw") (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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to the jury selection process,108 even though they both affirm the im-
portance of jury diversity. 109
Yet because the Batson Court recognized that race is significant to
the way a juror will perform-and thus is significant to jury impartial-
ity-the Batson doctrine is problematic. The doctrine recognizes that,
because race marks a distinguishable social history and position (fac-
tors that are the origin of general bias), it makes a difference in how a
juror will judge a defendant, the prosecution, and the social events
described by the evidence. In sum, the doctrine recognizes that race
can make a difference in the jury's verdict. Given that fact, a strike
based on race is not necessarily unfounded, or racist in the sense of a
groundless and irrational prejudice. In fact, race marks a probable
bias (or perspective) that is the premise of the fair cross section doc-
trine's idea of impartiality. Batson denies litigants, who can strike ju-
rors based on any other bias, the opportunity to strike based upon a
constitutionally recognized bias. On one hand, Batson denies the sali-
ence of bias on the basis of race group membership by declaring it an
improper basis on which to strike ajuror;10 on the other hand, Batson
acknowledges and privileges that bias by serving to increase the odds a
jury will be racially diverse, even though diversity on no other basis-
save gender-is so protected.1 '
108. The substance-process distinction, always a flimsy one if pressed too hard, gets
murky here because the actions improperly affecting the process are actions based upon
substantive (or political) decisions. The cases, ostensibly guaranteeing only proper jury
selection procedures, do so only after making substantive value judgments. Thus, the fair
cross section cases and the Batson line of cases side against the ability of parties or state
actors to act on certain judgments or opinions, and in that sense the cases are substantive
limits.
109. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 86; Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946); Peters
v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504 n.12 (1972). See also supra notes 64-74.
110. One could understand Batson to deny litigants the right to strike jurors for racist
reasons (in the sense of irrational and inaccurate stereotypes), as distinguished from legiti-
mate race-based reasons. But the prohibition must ban all race-based strikes because we
cannot distinguish legitimate from illegitimate decisions. When the strike was peremptory,
there was no way to know whether a party struck a black (or white) juror for some racist
reason, or because the party recognized that blacks (like whites) are more likely to render
a verdict disfavorable to that party given the racial dynamics of the case. Furthermore, the
line between racist stereotypes and legitimate race-based decisions sometimes blurs. If, in a
given case, black jurors are more likely than white jurors to render a verdict favorable to a
black defendant, is it racist to strike them ("blacks cannot be fair; they favor their own
kind") or empirically sound and rationally defensible ("studies show all-black juries acquit
in such cases more often than all-white juries")? The strike is motivated in some sense by
race, but is it motivated by racism?
111. Groups cognizable under the Sixth Amendment are broader, and more flexible
over time, than the suspect classes cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause. See Lau-
rie Magid, Challenges tojuty Composition: Purging the Sixth Amendment Analysis of Equal Protec-
tion Concepts, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1081, 1104-05 (1987).
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B. Holland v. Illinois: Impartiality Versus Representativeness
The Court's decision in Holland v. Illinois'12 disrupts the unity of
purpose between the fair cross section requirement and the Batson
doctrine."' In Holland, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
fair cross section doctrine does not prohibit a prosecutor from exer-
cising peremptory strikes on the same racial grounds that Batson held
were prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. 1 4 The Court empha-
sized again that the fair cross section requirement is limited to the
composition of the venire" and that it provides no guarantee as to
the representativeness of the final petit jury.116
Holland downplays any connection between a petit jury's repre-
sentativeness and its impartiality. 7 Earlier opinions had emphasized
that a key goal of the representative venire was to make a representa-
tive petitjury more likely;11 a diverse jury was at least an aspiration
that served the overall goal of impartiality. Holland articulates a differ-
ent vision ofjury composition, one that presumes a tension between a
jury that is impartial and one that is representative of the community.
In the view of the Holland majority, due to the fair cross section re-
quirement the venire starts out representative of the community.' 19
The parties may then diminish that representativeness by striking the
jurors they determine to be most partial to the other side. ° That
process of peremptory strikes" leads, in the Holland Court's view, to a
112. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
113. See supra notes 94-111 and accompanying text.
114. Holland, 493 U.S. at 478.
115. Id. at 482-83.
116. Id. at 480 (stating that the Sixth Amendment "is derived from the traditional un-
derstanding of how an 'impartial jury' is assembled [but] ... has never included the notion
that, in the process of drawing the jury, that initial representativeness cannot be
diminished").
117. See Darin Patrick McAtee, Recent Developments: Race-Based Peremptory Challenges and
the Sixth Amendment: Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990), 13 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
1061, 1066 (1990).
118. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (concluding, however, that "[w]e
impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community
.. "); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 n.20 (1979); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162,
173 (1986).
119. Holland, 493 U.S. at 480.
120. Id.; see McAtee, supra note 117, at 1063-64.
121. The Court reaffirmed the value of the peremptory strike system by noting that
"[o] ne could plausibly argue ... that the requirement of an 'impartial jury' impliedly com-
pels peremptory challenges," that the tradition of those challenges "was already venerable
at the time of Blackstone," and that the "constitutional phrase 'impartial jury' must surely
take its content from this unbroken tradition" of peremptory strikes. Holland, 493 U.S. at
481-82.
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petit jury that is even more impartial than the venire was.122 The Hol-
land vision of jury impartiality implies that a petit jury may be more
impartial than the venire by virtue of being less representative.
123
Holland implies a change in the idea of how an impartial jury is
composed. Earlier decisions described an impartial jury as one con-
taining members from several groups within the community.1 2 4 In
this view, most jurors are not more partial, in terms of general or per-
spective bias, 125 than any others (or than an ideal juror). Rather, all
jurors come to the courtroom with certain perspectives and exper-
iences that will affect their deliberation and judgment.1 26 The way to
achieve impartiality on a jury, therefore, is to have a mix of these dif-
ferent perspectives and biases and to let them inform each other dur-
ing deliberation.1 27
In Holland, by contrast, the Court posits that some jurors in the
venire are more partial or biased than others and that the jury selec-
tion process eliminates the most biased candidates so that the final
petit jury comprises the most neutral jurors. 21 In that view, there is
122. Id. at 480.
123. Justice Stevens acknowledged this position and partially agreed with it in his Hol-
land dissent. See id. at 513 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A randomly selected jury will not
necessarily be 'impartial' in the strict sense of that term, because the jurors bring to the
jury box prejudice and perspectives gained from their lifetimes of experience.") (citing
VAN DKE, supra note 27, at 18).
124. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (concluding that a representa-
tive jury assures impartiality); see supra note 76; Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526, 530 (holding that
the presence of a fair cross section of the community is essential to satisfy the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of an impartial jury trial).
125. Certainly, there is variation among jurors in terms of their specific bias. That is,
some may have been exposed to prejudicial pretrial publicity, including inadmissible evi-
dence, and others have not; one juror may be related to the defendant while the others are
not. There is much less, if any, variation in the jurors' general bias, at least as that concept
is defined herein. All jurors are members of certain groups (religious, racial, economic,
gender, regional) that influence their perspectives on human events. General bias in one
direction is not any more objectively incorrect than is an equally strong general bias in the
opposite direction. To take one example: with respect to a defendant that is African
American, black jurors will not be "biased" while whites are "unbiased." Instead, black
jurors will interpret the evidence in light of their particular experience as African Ameri-
cans, while white jurors will do the same from their own perspective.
126. Consciously or not, this perspective is usually manifested as an "in-group" bias-a
predisposition to view sympathetically the statements or predicaments of people who are
most like members of the group. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 80, at 235-36 (discussing the
egocentric bias" of jurors).
127. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that a jury must be a representative mix of perspectives in order to
achieve "diffuse impartiality").
128. For scholarship articulating the same argument, see Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary
Ellen Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation,
41 MD. L. REv. 337, 342 (1982).
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no need for a mix of perspectives, because all perspectives, or biases,
are not equal. The goal is to remove the bad potential jurors and
keep the good ones; to remove extreme or close-minded members of
the venire and keep the moderate and enlightened ones.'29 Such a
view is plausible if the only bias at issue is specific bias, but the fair
cross section doctrine is addressed to general bias. Although the Hol-
land Court acknowledges the existence of general bias, that is, that a
juror likely has a particular perspective or bias due to her group mem-
bership and consequent life experience, Holland affirms a prosecu-
tor's right, so far as the Sixth Amendment is concerned, to strike
jurors on the basis of that general bias-on the basis of their member-
ship in a racial group.' The inconsistency in the Holland view is that
it acknowledges general bias and affirms the prosecutor's ability to
strike jurors because of such bias, but it fails to acknowledge that the
jurors remaining-now a less representative sample of the commu-
nity-also have biases, and their deliberations will not be informed by
the views and biases of their colleagues from other groups. The Hol-
land paradigm might succeed if all biased jurors could be struck, so
that only neutral jurors remain; but Holland itself acknowledges that
no jurors are truly neutral because all are members of some group."' 1
129. Cf Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Posner on Kennedy and Racial Difference: White Author-
ity in the Legal Academy, 41 DUKE L.J. 1095 (1992) (criticizing Judge Posner for a position
largely analogous to that of the Holland court).
130. See Holland 493 U.S. at 481 (noting that parties may "use peremptory challenges to
eliminate prospective jurors belonging to groups it believes would unduly favor the other
side"). The Court did not even pretend that parties use peremptory strikes for more osten-
sibly legitimate reasons than membership in a racial group-reasons such as to remove
jurors who have revealed personal views or information about themselves that may indicate
some bias that falls short of providing a basis for a challenge for cause.
131. Save for this internal inconsistency, the Holland majority's opinion is largely a re-
turn to a vision of the jury that predates the fair cross section doctrine. Formerly, both
state and federal courts often empaneled juries by the "key man" system, in which jury
commissioners were appointed to identify appropriate citizens to serve jury duty. See
SHELVIN SINGER & MARSHALL J. HARTMAN, CONSTrruJTiONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HAND-
BOOK § 21.5, at 694 (1986); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); see also supra notes
44-46 and accompanying text. The aim of that system was to give one person the discretion
to identify for jury service those citizens of notable wisdom, moderation, and good charac-
ter. The procedure, however, consistently yielded an underrepresentation of the poor,
nonwhites, women, and other groups. See VAN DYKE, supra note 27, at 14-15; Amar, supra
note 31, at 1287. The old system therefore was consistent with the Holland vision in that
citizens who make better jurors were thought to possess more of the valued characteristics
than others possess, in the view that those characteristics exist independently of other bi-
ases that affect jury decisionmaking, and in the view that no other factors existing in the
community, such as the perspective gained from women or racial minorities, merits repre-
sentation on the jury.
Because peremptory challenges are a tool by which the parties can reduce the repre-
sentativeness of the venire mandated by the Sixth Amendment, strong supporters of per-
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Justice Marshall dissented in Holland. He argued that the fair
cross section requirement is a Sixth Amendment guarantee separate
and distinct from the guarantee of an impartial jury. 32 In his view,
impartiality is largely a matter of seating twelve jurors who are without
specific bias.133 The fair cross section rule, on the other hand, is es-
sential to providing the defendant with "the commonsense judgment
of the community."134 It is this community judgment, Marshall ar-
gued, rather than the jurors' impartiality, that guards defendants
against the overzealous prosecutor and the biased or overconditioned
judge."l 5 Because his concern is to ensure selection of a jury that can
render the community's judgment, Marshall correctly sees the fair
cross section rule as the proper mechanism for combining all the vari-
ous general biases (which result from the various group memberships
of the jurors) in the community, so that each is countered and in-
formed by the others.'3 6 Allowing prosecutors to strike representa-
emptory challenges, such as the Holland majority, usually put less emphasis on the
importance of the representativeness of jury panels. See, e.g., Sam Ervin, Jury Reform Needs
More Thought, 53 A.B.A.J. 132, 134 (1967) (arguing that the "cross-section of the commu-
nity" standard improperly assumes that "justice is a function of 'class.'"); Note, Peremptory
Challenges and the Meaning of Juyy Representation, 89 YALE L.J. 1177 (1980) (suggesting that
the averaging of juror viewpoints, with its impact on the verdict, is crucial to community
representation). On the other hand, those who seek to maximize the chances that petit
juries will represent a cross section of the community argue for the limitation or abolition
of peremptory challenges. See Amar, supra note 31, at 1288. See also GARtcA, supra note
103, at 192-96 (calling the peremptory challenge "that quintessentially undemocratic de-
vice"); VAN Dym, supra note 27, at 166-69 (proposing a compromise position restricting the
number of peremptory challenges in order to preserve the demographic integrity of the
jury); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 163-170
(1989) ("Peremptory challenges ensure the selection of jurors on the basis of insulting
stereotypes without substantially advancing the goal of making juries more impartial.");
Martin H. Levin, The Jury in a Criminal Case: Obstacles to Impartiality, 24 CiuM. L. BuLL. 492,
517-19 (1988) (proposing that courts forbid peremptory challenges because attorneys do
not use the challenges solely to obtain impartial juries).
132. Holland, 493 U.S. at 493-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. These are jurors who are impartial with respect to the particular case. The fair
cross section requirement ensures that a juror will not be struck "'for reasons completely
unrelated to the ability of members of the group to serve as jurors in a particular case,'-
that is, for the reason of their general, rather than specific, bias. Id. at 496 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986)).
134. Id. at 495 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174-75) (citation
omitted).
135. See id. at 495 (Marshall, J., dissenting). To view Marshall's position through the
paradigm of this Article, the impartiality requirement guards against specific bias, while
the fair cross section rule guards against an unrepresentative concentration of general bias.
A community's "commonsense" judgment (which it reaches through balancing its general
biases) is the appropriate mechanism with which to check the general factors that run
through criminal trials regardless of the defendant: the credibility of police and prosecu-
tors, and the bias of judges.
136. See McAtee, supra note 117, at 1065.
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tives of particular groups directly contravenes that goal of the Sixth
Amendment because it takes certain biases out of the jury but leaves
others in, skewing the jury's collective judgment.
TV. VENUE AND VICINAGE: THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF THE JURY
A. Constitutional Guarantees of Venue and Vicinage
The Constitution provides criminal defendants with two separate
guarantees that their criminal trial will be held in the jurisdiction in
which the crime was committed. For federal criminal defendants, Sec-
tion two of Article III provides that "the Trial of all Crimes... shall be
held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been commit-
ted."'3 7 Additionally, the Sixth Amendment ensures both state and
federal defendants that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed
.... -138 Analogous state law provisions vary considerably, and only
about half of the states guarantee the defendant a trial in the venue in
which the crime was committed.' 39 Moreover, in limited circum-
stances, the Due Process Clause guarantees defendants the right to
transfer the trial to another venue. Due to the incorporation of the
137. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
138. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The impartial jury trial clause of the Sixth Amendment
was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in Duncan v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961) (holding
that the defendant's trial was clearly unfair where jurors admitted that they thought the
defendant was guilty, but stated that they could nevertheless render an impartial verdict);
Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 511 (1971) (holding that a state law prohibiting a
change of venue in misdemeanor cases violatives the right to a trial by an impartial jury).
The vicinage portion of that clause was not at issue in Duncan or Groppi, however, and it
could be argued that the vicinage provision therefore has not been incorporated against
the states, even though all other portions of the Sixth Amendment have. Moreover, the
wording of the vicinage clause-requiring that the jury must come from the "State or dis-
trict" in which the crime was committed-renders its incorporation somewhat awkward.
Obviously, states will prosecute violators of state law only within the state, so the "State"
part of the "State and district" phrase is superfluous upon incorporation. Furthermore,
"district" does not necessarily identify a common judicial division within a state as it does
federal court districts. Although many states are divided into judicial districts, county or
city boundaries are also frequent divisions for purposes of jurisdiction and judicial
administration.
It is clear, however, that the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment impartial jury
clause into the Fourteenth Amendment brings state change of venue laws under the pur-
view of the United States Constitution. In particular, the Sixth Amendment forbids states
to place limits on a defendant's right to demand a venue change when such is the only way
to provide an impartial jury. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 717; Groppi, 400 U.S. at 511.
139. SeeAndrew L. Faber, Note, Change of Venue in Criminal Cases: The Defendant's Right to
Specify the County of Transfer, 26 STAN. L. REv. 131, 149-50 nn.98-101 (1973) (summarizing
the variety of venue and vicinage provisions in state constitutions and codes).
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Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment 4 ° as well as due
process requirements, all states have a mechanism for changing venue
to protect the defendant from an unfair jury.14 1
Technically, Article III provides the venue guarantee, meaning
the location in which the trial will be held, while the Sixth Amend-
ment contains the vicinage provision, which furnishes a right to have a
jury selected from a particular community regardless of where the
trial is held. As a practical matter, the distinction is of little impor-
tance because American courts rarely have attempted to draw a jury
from one community and hold the trial in another. 4 Together, the
two clauses serve to assure the defendant that his trial will be con-
ducted in, and his jury selected from, the community in which he al-
legedly committed the crime.
In modern case law, venue issues arise almost exclusively when
defendants attempt to waive their rights to be tried in the local venue
and by the local vicinage, in an effort to obtain a more impartial
jury.14 Waiver permits transfer of the trial to another, less prejudiced
140. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 145.
141. See Faber, supra note 139, at 150 (suggesting that in states that do not have constitu-
tional venue or vicinage requirements, the same rights are statutory).
142. 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 301, at 190 (2d ed.
1982) (concluding that the distinction between the Article III venue guarantee and the
Sixth Amendment's vicinage guarantee "has been of no importance"); William W. Blume,
The Place of Tial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REv. 59, 65
(1944); United States v. Possodelis, 615 F.2d 975, 977 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980). But see Drew
Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 801, 828-29 (1976) [hereinafter Kershen, Vicinage 1]
(discussing the potential importance of distinguishing between venue and vicinage); see
also Kershen, Vicinage II, supra note 57, at 130-38 (explaining that the government has the
option to change venue when the original locality is in rebellion, but that the defendant
may require the government to bring jurors from that rebellious vicinage into the new
venue).
Juries from a distant vicinage occasionally have been brought into a venue for trial.
See, e.g., Peter D. O'Connell, Pretrial Publicity, Change of Venue, Public Opinion Polls-A Theory
of Procedural Justice, 65 U. DETROIT L. REv. 169, 179 (1988) (discussing the Illinois trial of
John Wayne Gacy). There is a strong argument that in certain circumstances federal de-
fendants have a right to ajury from a different vicinage so that they do not have to waive
their Article III venue right in order to be tried by an impartial jury. See Kershen, Vicinage
II, supra note 57, at 147.
143. Like other constitutional rights, defendants can waive their Article III and Sixth
Amendment venue rights. See 2 WIGr, supra note 142, § 306, at 219-20 n.2, § 341, at 245;
FED. R. CRIM. P. 20. See generally William Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA.
L. REv. 761 (1989) (discussing theories of the criminal procedure waiver doctrine).
The other context in which venue issues arise in modern cases is federal statutes that
create multiple venues for a single crime. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275
(1944) ("[A]n illegal use of the mails or of other instruments of commerce may subject the
user to prosecution in the district where he sent the goods, or in the district of their arrival,
or in any intervening district.").
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locale.144 Although courts can employ a variety of tactics to alleviate
some forms of prejudice (including limiting the news media in court,
restricting attorney statements to the media, sequestration of witnesses
and jurors, continuance until prejudice abates, and voir dire145),
transfer to a different venue sometimes is essential to empaneling a
fair jury.146
The cases in which the Supreme Court has forged its jurispru-
dence of venue have involved not only change of venue issues to be
adjudicated under the Due Process Clause, but also have involved al-
most exclusively problems of pretrial publicity that also implicated
due process concerns. 147 In some circumstances, such as those at is-
sue in Estes v. Texas148 and Rideau v. Louisiana,149 the publicity was so
144. See FED. R. CraM. P. 20(a). There is the possibility of a conflict between the defend-
ant's right to be tried by an impartial jury and his right to be tried within the venue in
which the crime was committed. If the community is irreversibly prejudiced, but the de-
fendant refuses to waive his venue right, then a fair trial may be impossible. One commen-
tator has suggested resolving that problem by simply abrogating the defendant's venue
right and allowing the court to force a venue change without his consent. See Scott Kafker,
Comment, The Right to Venue and the Right to an Impartial Jury: Resolving the Conflict in the
Federal Constitution, 52 U. CH. L. REV. 729, 746-50 (1985). An alternative resolution, occa-
sionally employed, is simply to dismiss the charges against the defendant. See United States
v. Cotton, No. 68-CR-113 (E.D. Wis. 1969), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 45 (1970). For a dis-
cussion of the Cotton case, see Kafker, supra, at 735-36. The alternative resolution em-
ployed in Cotton is supported by the argument that a community that has become so
irrevocably prejudiced that it cannot render a fair trial should pay for its prejudice by
watching suspects set free without trial.
145. See Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510 (1971); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 358-63 (1966); Kafker, supra note 144, at 732. See generally O'Connell, supra note 142,
at 186-94 (discussing four vehicles for mitigating the prejudicial effect of pretrial
publicity).
146. Given the strong protection of the free press and of the public nature of trials,
effective restriction of pretrial publicity sometimes is impossible. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at
349-52. Moreover, few of the aforementioned methods will be effective if the problem is
widespread acquaintance with the defendant or victim or a diffuse bias such as racial preju-
dice that infects a large part of the community. See United States v. Means, 409 F. Supp.
115 (D.N.D. 1976).
147. As a result, much of the scholarship on venue transfer discusses the doctrine solely
in terms of prejudicial pretrial publicity. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
§ 8-3.3(c) (2d ed. 1980) ("A motion for change of venue or continuance shall be granted
whenever it is determined that, because of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial materia4
there is a substantial likelihood that, in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be
had.") (emphasis added); 2 WIGHT, supra note 142, § 342, at 249-56 (discussing only pub-
licity as the source of prejudice in a community); Raymond L. Spring, Change of Venue: A
Need for Traditional Reemphasis, 54JuDicATuRE 15, 15-17 (June-July 1970) (noting how courts
and commentators have come to think of prejudice as arising solely from pretrial publicity
and arguing that courts need to recognize prejudice from other sources, such as word of
mouth in small communities).
148. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
149. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
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extreme that the Court held that the circumstances had raised a pre-
sumption of prejudice and that the Due Process Clause required the
use of a jury selected from a different community.150
150. In Estes, the Court found that the "massive pretrial publicity" that gave the case
"national notoriety"-including live television broadcast of a pretrial hearing'-was so in-
herently prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of due process. Estes, 381 U.S. at 535.
The Court stated:
It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process deprivations we re-
quire a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times a
procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will
result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process.
Id. at 542-43. The Estes Court noted that the presence of news reporters in the courtroom
gave proceedings a "notorious character" that made a fair trial impossible. Id. at 538.
The Estes standard was based on Rideau, which was decided two years earlier. In that
case, the defendant's state court trial was conducted in a county in which a film of his
confession to the sheriff was repeatedly broadcast on local television before trial. The
Court concluded, without requiring other evidence of actual prejudice from the defend-
ant, that it was a denial of due process to refuse the defendant's request for a change of
venue. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726-27. The Rideau Court held that the Due Process Clause
required a jury selected from a community that had not seen the film. See id. at 727.
The presumption of prejudice standard was reaffirmed in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (concluding that the totality of the circumstances regarding pretrial
publicity demonstrated a denial of due process and noting that some circumstances can be
deemed inherently lacking in due process); see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031
(1984) (CA]dverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a com-
munity that the jurors' claims that they can be impartial should not be believed."). See
generally O'Connell, supra note 142, at 185-92 (discussing the prevailing standards for the
grant of a change of venue due to prejudicial pretrial publicity).
In less extreme situations, the Court has held that defendants must demonstrate a
probability or a reasonable likelihood of prejudice. Subsequent cases have found no de-
nial of an impartial jury despite substantial pretrial publicity when the Court has con-
cluded either that time had dissipated any prejudice sparked by publicity or that the jurors
had not been prejudiced by the publicity to which they had been exposed. E.g., Dobbert v.
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 303 (1977) (finding no constitutional violation even though the jury
was picked from a community in which there was much pretrial publicity; jurors need not
be totally ignorant of facts and issues involved if they can "lay aside" pre-conceived opin-
ions: "[E]xtensive knowledge in the community of either the crimes or the putative crimi-
nal is not sufficient by itself to render a trial constitutionally unfair.") (citing Murphy v.
Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798 (1975)); Patton, 467 U.S. at 1025 (holding that the defendant,
whose murder conviction was overturned and who was retried in the same county four
years later, was not deprived of an impartial jury when he was denied a change of venue in
the second trial because public passion had died down with passage of time).
Change of venue motions are made in federal court under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 21, which provides for transfer to another district at the defendant's request "if
the court is satisfied that there exists in the district where the prosecution is pending so
great a prejudice against the defendant that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impar-
tial trial" anywhere within the district. FED. R. CIuM. P. 21 (a). The most widely articulated
standard under the rule is that the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of
prejudice. See 2 WpiucHT, supra note 142, § 342, at 248 & n.7. The Supreme Court cases set
the outer parameters of that standard, defining those rare situations in which prejudice
must be presumed and the larger class of cases in which the defendant must demonstrate
actual prejudice. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 542-43 (noting that a showing of actual prejudice is
required). District courts have considerable discretion in granting venue transfers pursu-
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The context of this case law creates the mistaken impression that
venue protections, and change of venue doctrine, address themselves
exclusively to issues of specific bias resulting either from pretrial pub-
licity about the case or widespread community acquaintance with a
key figure in the trial. In fact, both the Article III and the Sixth
Amendment venue clauses (as well as many state constitution prede-
cessors) were devised more to provide defendants with a guarantee of
the social character of their juries and to prevent the government
from transferring cases to venues in which the populace-irrespective
of any publicity or other specific bias-would be less sympathetic to
the defendant.
B. History and Purpose of the Venue and Vicinage Guarantees
Both the Article III and the Sixth Amendment clauses were in-
tended foremost to provide procedural safeguards for defendants"'
by removing the government's power to select the venue for prosecu-
tion. The Article III clause, in particular, was a reaction to English
attempts to transfer venue to England or to other colonies without the
defendant's consent.'52 In the decades preceding the American
Revolution, England attempted to remove (often to England) some
ant to Rule 21 and have exercised that discretion to grant changes of venue very infre-
quently. See 2 WIGrr, supra note 142, § 342, at 248-49 & nn. 8 & 9; Faber, supra note 139,
at 132-33.
151. See VAN DYKE, supra note 27, at 7 (recounting how these constitutional provisions
addressed the compromised legal position of colonial defendants under British rule); Ker-
shen, Vicinage I, supra note 142, at 827 (noting that the Sixth Amendment vicinage provi-
sion was placed among other procedural rights of defendants); GARciA, supra note 103, at
183-85 (explaining that the right to a jury trial generally was an individual right of the
defendant to protect against government oppression); 2 WRIGHT, supra note 142, § 341, at
245 (discussing the defendant's privilege to waive his venue rights under FED. R. CRIM. P.
21); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 116 (1st Cir. 1952) ("The right to apply for a
change of venue is for the defendant's benefit and at his option.").
Concomitant state provisions regarding venue also protect defendants' interests pro-
cedurally. See, e.g., State v. Mendoza, 258 N.W.2d 260, 265-66 (Wis. 1977) (upholding de-
fendant's objection to trial court's sua sponte change of venue on grounds that the order
violated the right to be tried in the vicinage of the crime pursuant to the Wisconsin and
United States Constitutions).
152. Although the clause does not guarantee that the trial will be held in the defend-
ant's home community, the framers presumed it would often serve to keep the trial there.
Even when the locale of the crime and the trial is different from the defendant's home, the
defendant at least retains the advantage of being able to investigate and call witnesses from
that locale to defend himself. See VAN DYKE, supra note 27, at 7 (noting that some opposi-
tion to the Constitution was based on fears that the Article III venue provision was too
broad and thus insufficiently protected the defendant's concurrent interest in a trial by her
peers); Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 142, at 811-12; see also Multi-Venue, supra note 55, at
410, 413; Kafker, supra note 144, at 741-46. The Supreme Court has also recognized the
importance to a defendant of being tried in his home community:
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criminal trials from their original colonial venues, where the populace
was hostile to English governance and empathic with defendants.15
The Virginia House of Burgesses formally objected to the practice,
demanding that "all Trials for ... any Felony or Crime whatsoever,
committed and done in this his Majesty's said Colony... [should] out
of Right to be... held within the said Colony."15 4 The same grievance
was listed in the Declaration of Independence, which complained of
"transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended Offences."' 55
[W]e do not wish to be understood as approving the practice of indicting citizens
of distant states in the courts of this District, where an indictment will lie in the
state of the domicil of such person, unless in exceptional cases, where the circum-
stances seem to demand that this course shall be taken. To require a citizen to
undertake a long journey across the continent to face his accusers, and to incur
the expense of taking his witnesses, and of employing counsel in a distant city,
involves a serious hardship, to which he ought not to be subjected if the case can
be tried in a court of its own jurisdiction.
Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 78 (1905); see also United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275
(1944) (noting the history of Article III and the "needless hardship to an accused by prose-
cution remote from home and from appropriate facilities for defense"). But seeJohnston v.
United States, 351 U.S. 215, 220-21 (1956) (noting that the "requirement of venue states
the public policy that fixes the situs of the trial in the vicinage of the crime rather than the
residence of the accused"); Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 634 (1961) ("The use of
agencies of interstate commerce enables Congress to place venue in any district where the
particular agency was used."). Thus, although trial in the defendant's home community is
a preference that has been long recognized, venue law does not protect or guarantee that
preference because the doctrine is solely concerned with the location of the crime. See id.
153. Parliament had enacted statutes that permitted trials for charges of treason and
certain other crimes to be held in any county in the "realm" that the prosecution chose.
See 35 Henry VIII, c.2 (1543) (revived by the British Parliament in 1769); 12 Geo., III, c.24
(1772); 14 Geo. III, c.39 (1774); Blume, supra note 142, at 63-64; Kershen, Vicinage I, supra
note 142, at 805-12.
154. Blume, supra note 142, at 64-65. More fully, the Virginia legislature declared:
[A] II Trials for Treason, Misprison of Treason, or for any Felony or Crime whatso-
ever, committed and done in this his Majesty's said Colony.. . ought of Right to
be had, and.., held within the said Colony... and that.. . sending such Person
or Persons to Places beyond the Sea, to be tried, is highly derogatory of the Rights
of British subjects ....
Id. at 64 (quoting from the JOuRNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES, 1766-1769, 214 (Ken-
nedy ed., 1906)). The body made clear its sympathy for the defendant threatened with
trial away from his home and the scene of the crime:
For, how truly deplorable must be the Case of a wretched American, who... is
dragged from his native Home, and his dearest domestick Connections, thrown
into Prison ... to exchange his Imprisonment in his own Country, for Fetters
amongst Strangers?
Id at 65. See generally GARciA, supra note 103, at 184-85 ("[R] oots of revolt against English
rule may be partially traced to fierce resistance to British attempts to restrict or evade the
right to ajury trial.").
155. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 21 (U.S. 1776). See also Kershen, Vici-
nage I, supra note 142, at 807.
1994]
MARYLAND LAW REVwEw
The Sixth Amendment vicinage guarantee appears to have been
motivated by the same concerns, 156 but assurance of trial by a jury
drawn from the community in which the crime was committed had a
somewhat less consistent history, particularly in the American colo-
nies. 157 Some colonies made no provision for it, while others in-
cluded it as a basic right.15 Nevertheless, in 1774 the Continental
Congress included "peers from [the defendant's] vicinage" 159 as an es-
sential component of the "great right.., of trial byjury."160 The first
Congress's drafting of the Sixth Amendment was marked by strong
support for the vicinage provision from James Madison and the House
of Representatives. After revisions deleted the word "vicinage" from
Madison's proposal, the Senate, where the provision enjoyed less sup-
port, acceded to the House's demand for a guarantee to defend-
ants of trial "by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed."
162
156. Venue and vicinage concepts are so closely intertwined that colonists used vicinage
arguments against English attempts to change trial venues. In the vast majority of cases
jurors were chosen from the community in which the trial was held, making venue and
vicinage identical. See Blume, supra note 142, at 65-66 (noting that colonists insisted on
rights of "vicinage" for purposes of escaping transportation overseas for trial). But see OLI-
VER P. CHrrwoOD, JUSrcE IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 67 (Leonard W. Levy ed., De Capo Press
reprint 1971) (1905) (recounting adoption of a 1662 Virginia statute that incorporated
English vicinage customs and provided that six men of a twelve man jury would be sum-
moned from the vicinity of the crime and six selected from bystanders).
157. See Multi-Venue, supra note 55, at 409 (noting that seven of the first 15 state constitu-
tions made some reference to venue or vicinage and that four required trial in the defend-
ant's vicinage).
158. Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 142, at 814-15 (noting the diversity among colonies
in the use of petit juries chosen from the vicinity of the crime).
159. Id at 815 (quoting from the Declaration of Violation of the Rights of the Colonists
by the First Continental Congress, 1774).
160. Id. (quoting from the address to the Province of Quebec from the Continental
Congress, 1774).
161. Id. at 822-27.
162. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Although the primary purpose of the venue and vicinage
clauses is to protect the rights of defendants, some have posited a secondary purpose for
the two clauses: to protect the right of the community in which the crime was committed
to try and resolve criminal cases according to local mores and sentiments. Cf United
States v. Means, 409 F. Supp. 115, 117 (D.N.D. 1976) (acknowledging the strength of a
community's interest in having those charged with violations of its laws tried within the
community); VAN DYKE, supra note 27, at 10-11 (arguing that the jury's role is not only to
protect the accused but also to represent the community that has been victimized); Ker-
shen, Vicinage I, supra note 142, at 808-10, 803-15; Multi-Venue, supra note 55, at 406 (quot-
ing MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HIsroRY OF ENGLAND 141 (1941)). There is little
explicit support for the idea that the community's interests also are protected in the his-
tory of the drafting of either clauses, but the theory of juries as local bodies serving as a
democratic check on overzealous prosecutors and biased judges is consistent with the rec-
ognition of those interests.
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Colonial objections to transfers of venue were not based solely on
the insulting implication that Americans were incapable of providing
fair trials,1 63 but rather on the two-fold advantage that transfers of
venue gave to the prosecution. A distant trial location took the de-
fendant away not only from family and friends but also from witnesses
and evidence available at the crime scene." Perhaps just as impor-
tantly, colonists recognized the hostility of British judges and juries.
Even if British fact finders were not hostile or biased in a malicious
sense-i.e., even if they acted in good faith-they were so likely to see
the situation from a different perspective or set of social prejudices
that Americans correctly recognized that they were at a disadvantage.
Even if the British forum comported with contemporary notions of
due process, Americans recognized the disadvantage created by the
interpretive bias of that forum.1 65
Thus, the venue and vicinage clauses implicitly recognize that the
composition of thejury-and of the community from which the jury is
drawn-is crucial to the jury's character, and therefore to the nature
of its impartiality. These clauses originally protected defendants not
against specific biases from sources such as pretrial publicity, but
rather against being tried by a community having a different social
character or historical perspective from the community in which the
crime occurred. In the late eighteenth century, changing venue from
Virginia to England would cause a substantial change in a jury's gen-
eral bias-as substantial as the change would be today from moving a
venue from Washington, D.C., to Ventura County, California, for ex-
ample. 166 Venue doctrine recognizes that, even when jurors hold no
specific bias and act in good faith, the unavoidable interpretive bias
arising from their social origins can make a substantive difference in
the outcome of the case.
167
163. A 1774 statute suggested precisely that-that in Massachusetts "an indifferent trial
cannot be had." See Blume, supra note 142, at 630 (quoting 14 Geo. III, c. 39 (1774)).
164. Those advantages continue to be factors that defendants weigh in considering a
change of venue, see State v. Mendoza, 258 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Wis. 1977), and that the
Supreme Court recognizes as important concerns in defining a proper venue. See United
States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944).
165. See Massaro, supra note 30, at 508, 550-51 (discussing the importance of same-group
membership to a jury of one's "peers").
166. In the nineteenth century, the importance of venue was demonstrated by the fact
that juries in northern states rarely convicted defendants charged with aiding escaped
slaves under the federal Fugitive Slave Law. See SIMON, supra note 78, at 7.
167. Id. This is the bias that was recognized by the defendants in the Marion Barry and
the Rodney King beating cases. See, e.g., Cannon & Smith, supra note 6, at A29 (discussing
the grant of the defendants' request for a venue change to an overwhelmingly white subur-
ban county in the King beating case); Thompson & Gellman, supra note 3, at Al (noting
the composition of the jury drawn from the District of Columbia in Barry's trial); see also
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That the Constitution's venue and vicinage clauses protect
against transfer to a venue with a substantively different social charac-
ter than the original venue supports the idea that courts should recog-
nize differences in the racial composition of an alternative venue.
The differences between venues that defendants risk today most often
arise from racial distinctions rather than nationalist ones. Venues that
differ dramatically in racial demography create the possibility of preju-
dicial (or favorable) bias for the defendant. The framers of the Con-
stitution recognized that communities may be biased against a
defendant for unspecified, hard-to-define reasons of popular senti-
ment, common experience, and group identification. Ample data
demonstrates that analogous factors are at work among different ra-
cial and economic groups. 168 Yet courts have been reluctant to ac-
knowledge what the framers assumed-that even when particular
venirepersons will not admit in voir dire a bias against a defendant,
differences in sentiment, experience, prejudice and perspective still
can exist among communities, and thus a venue change may substan-
tively change the nature of the jury's impartiality. 69
V. AN ANTIFOUNDATIONALIST DESCRIPTION OF THE JURY FUNCTION
A. The Theory of Jury Decisionmaking
The importance of jury composition depends on how we under-
stand the jury's task. In its most concise statement, a jury's job is to
determine the truth.17° In the legal context, ascertaining the truth
traditionally occurs in two parts: historical fact discovery (whether the
defendant committed the prohibited act) and assessment of moral
culpability (whether the defendant acted with the requisite criminal
Joan B. McConahay et al., The Use of Social Science in Trials with Racial Overtones: The Tial of
Joan Little, 41 LAw & CoNTEMP. PoBas. 205, 209-14, 226 (Winter 1977) (discussing elaborate
evidence offered by murder defendant Joan Little in a successful effort to move venue
from rural, conservative eastern North Carolina to Orange County, North Carolina, which
has a more prosperous, educated, and diverse population).
168. See generally Sheri L. Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv.
1611 (1985) [hereinafter Johnson, Black Innocence] (setting forth trial data that reveals a
tendency among whites to convict black defendants in instances in which white defendants
would be acquitted).
169. Occasionally, courts will acknowledge the salience of race in transfers of venue, or
at least its importance to public confidence in the jury's impartiality. See Pugh, supra note
10, at IA (discussing the trial of Miami police officer William Lozano, in which courts
changed venue a second time to a locale with a larger black population).
170. In the criminal context, it is more precisely to determine whether the prosecution's
version of events is, beyond a reasonable doubt, the truth.
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intent, making him deserving of community condemnation)."" On
that view, the jury's primary function is to voice the community's as-
sessment of the defendant's moral culpability. Reconstructing histori-
cal fact usually is the less problematic project' 72 and is a function that
can be performed just as well-perhaps better-by someone or some
process other than a jury.1 75
Yet the Sixth Amendment-including both the fair cross section
rule and the venue clause-concedes the importance of jurors' per-
spective and context. Such an acknowledgement requires that the
idea of truth discovery be understood in a framework other than the
traditional foundational, or subjectivistic, epistemology. 174 The tradi-
tional view is marked by a faith in the possibility of finding objective
truth: it assumes a perceiving subject separate from the world that she
inhabits, the objects she observes, and the phenomena she exper-
iences.' 75 Truth discovery is described as the process by which the
subject strives for a clear and unbiased view of an object, which can be
known in its true essence via objective reason and method. This para-
digm permits a positivistic formulation of fact-finding and truth dis-
covery; one seeks to settle disputes by discovery and reference to the
external object at issue. Investigation is modeled on natural science
methodology, which posits the possibility of inquiry conducted from a
neutral, Archimedean vantage point.
76
171. See Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Bur-
ger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L. REv. 185, 213-14 (1983) (distinguishing "legal
guilt" and "factual guilt"); see also HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF CRIMINAL SANCTION 103-
35 (1968) (discussing mens rea in the context of mistake and excuse); Kim L. Scheppele,
Foreward: Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2089 (1989) (discussing the effort to
arrive at an objective factual account of events).
172. Moreover, the difficulty of fact finding may be thought to be due largely to imper-
fect information; a jury lacks access to some uncontrovertible source of information such
as, for example, an audio-videotape, an unbiased eye witness to all relevant events, or some
other means of confirming key facts and claims. But see Race and the Criminal Process, supra
note 17, at 1559 (arguing that the "fact-finding ability" of juries also is "impaired in a way
that hurts minority defendants" by the underrepresentation of minorities on juries).
173. See Arenella, supra note 171, at 213-15.
174. See Scheppele, supra note 171, at 2088-94.
175. See GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMENEUTICs, TRIAtmON AND REASON 1-5, 139-66
(1987) (discussing traditional subjectivistic epistemology in contrast to the antifoundation-
alist phenomenology of Gadamer and Rorty); Jay Stone, The Phenomenological Roots of the
Radical Democracy/Marxism Debate, 7 RETHINKING MARXISM (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript
at 4, on file with author).
176. Subjectivistic epistemology is an essentially Platonic tradition in which truth is con-
ceived as an external objective reality capable of being discovered by using accurate, neu-
tral investigative strategies and rational analysis modeled on the paradigm of the natural
sciences. The human mind can discover, understand, and describe this external reality
without affecting it, and thereby possess a "mirror of nature." Around these concepts of
truth, rationalism, and objective reality developed the methodology of detached scientific
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Within this tradition, the race, gender or other social history of
the observer should make no difference, because truths exist separate
from the truthseeker.' 77 The social origin of jurors would have no
relevance to their task of fact-finding, the first half of the jury's two-
part process; the fair cross section doctrine would matter only when
jurors assessed the moral culpability of a defendant according to com-
munity standards.
Therefore, the relevance of the jury's social composition to its
fact-finding duties (that is, the necessity of a fair cross section to the
fact-finding task) can be explained only through an antifoundational-
ist epistemology.' 78 Antifoundationalists understand truth as a con-
clusion that cannot exist separate from the human mind.1 79 That is
investigation, which sought to eliminate and contrast itself with any form of investigation
or interpretation in which the observer/investigator affected the external reality or ulti-
mate conclusion. This paradigm fit best with the natural sciences, but the social sciences
and humanities-including the law and even literary criticism-took it as a model for prac-
tice. See generally WARNKE, supra note 175; RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF
NATURE (1979) [hereinafter RORTY, MIRROR OF NATuRE]; Joan Williams, Critical Legal Stud-
ies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429 (1987).
177. Cf Catharine McKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 638-39 (1983) (describing objectivist accounts that ignore the
social position of the observer as "point of viewlessness").
178. More accurately, this approach is described not as epistemology, but rather as phe-
nomenology, or phenomenological hermeneutics, because its premise entails the demise
of epistemology as that term refers to a science or method of understanding human knowl-
edge. See WARNKE, supra note 175, at 34-41, 147-51 (discussing phenomenology in juxtapo-
sition to traditional epistemology). Epistemology has been used more broadly in recent
decades, however, to include phenomenological or antifoundationalist descriptions of
human understanding along with foundationalist or subjectivist theories.
The label antifoundationalism is used herein rather than phenomenology because the
former is more common in legal scholarship and also may connote a broader theoretical
discussion. By either name, this viewpoint traces its origins most prominently to Hegel
and, in this century, Heidegger, but for the purposes of this Article representative theorists
and partisans include Hans-Georg Gadamer and Richard Rorty. See id. at 139-66. See gener-
ally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975); RORTY, MIRROR OF NATURE, supra
note 176; RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITrrY (1989) [hereinafter RORTY,
CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY]; HERMENEUTICS AND PRAxis (Richard Hollinger ed.,
1985). Antifoundationalist critiques, particularly in recent decades, have come from a vari-
ety of disciplines including the natural sciences, see, e.g., THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) (discussing how scientific revolutions alter the his-
torical perspectives of the communities that experience them), literary and linguistic stud-
ies, see, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976); and law, see, e.g., ROBERTO
UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY (1989) ("We cannot live without a set of formative institutional
arrangements and enacted deals of human association . .. [b]ut we can.., diminish the
force with which they contain and imprison us."); Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the
Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 639 (1990) [hereinafter Winter, Uses of Theory] (arguing that
developments in cognitive theory have undermined one aspect of antifoundationalist posi-
tion argued by Stanley Fish).
179. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY, supra note 178, at 4-5, 8.
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not to say that there is no external world, or reality, separate from the
mind, but simply that truths are human understandings or descrip-
tions about the world, and those understandings cannot be separated
from the human-created language used to describe them or the par-
ticular historical vantage point from which they are perceived. Dis-
putes cannot be settled by reference to facts, because we know and
understand facts only from a certain point of view, or-to put it an-
other way-we know facts only as we comprehend and describe them
within a particular language, cultural tradition, and social context.1 80
Antifoundationalism abandons the theoretical possibility of a de-
tached and objective observer, positing in its place a subject that is
always a part of that which it observes, whose perception is inevitably
contextualized, and for whom the only knowledge available is contin-
gent on the social history into which that person is thrown. 18 As Pro-
fessor Fish, a prominent partisan of the antifoundationalist position,
has put it: "Anti-foundationalism teaches that questions of fact, truth,
correctness, validity, and clarity can neither be posed nor answered in
reference to some extracontextual, ahistorical, nonsituational reality"
because such things "are intelligible and debatable only within the
precincts of the contexts or situations or paradigms or communities"
and are "inextricable from the social and historical circumstances in
which they do their work."
1 2
"Social and historical circumstances" provide the conceptual basis
for responding to criticisms raised by adherents of traditional subjec-
180. See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 338 (1980) [hereinafter FISH,
TEXT IN THIS CLASS] ("[D]isagreements cannot be resolved by reference to the facts, be-
cause the facts emerge only in the context of some point of view."); Scheppele, supra note
171, at 2081-82, 2085.
181. SeeW, aNq , supra note 175, at 34-41, 168-73; Stone, supra note 175, at 10-11; see also
SIMON, supra note 78, at 57 (discussing research conducted by Dale Broeder for the Chi-
cago Jury Project that confirms that "such factors play important roles in shaping a jury's
deliberations.").
182. STANLEY FISH, Antifoundationalism, Theoy, Hope, and the Teaching of Composition, in
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 342, 344-45 (1989) [hereinafter FISH, WHAT COMES
NATURALLY].
Fish also claims that the antifoundationalist insight and rejection of subjectivist episte-
mology have no consequences because "the situated subject.., is always constrained by the
local or community standards and criteria of which his judgment is an extension." STANLEY
FISH, Consequences, in FISH, WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra, at 323. We cannot renounce
prejudices "in favor of convictions we choose more freely" because that choice also re-
quires finding a position transcending context, a "moment of unconstrained choice." Id.
See also STANLEY FISH, Unger and Milton, in FISH, WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra, at 431-32
("[Y]ou don't challenge the presuppositions of some formative context merely by saying
that a challenge is possible."). For a contrasting view arguing that antifoundationalism
does create the possibility of a liberating freedom from previously unrecognized con-
straints, see Winter, Uses of Theoiy, supra note 178.
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tivist epistemology that antifoundationalism is relativistic. That is,
although knowledge is not grounded on unfiltered observations of re-
ality and brute data, the prejudices, language, and perspectives
through which it is achieved are shared among those with a common
historical experience. To a significant extent, we cannot choose our
prejudices and contexts because we are always already in the midst of
them.1 5 They constitute the very way we think, see, and understand.
The prejudices and prejudgments that inform our conclusions are not
mere whims or personal predilections. Rather, they are the shared
context or history that constrain our knowledge and perception and
that make agreement on most perceptions so common.1 8 4
Antifoundationalism patterns investigation and truth discovery
on a contemporary understanding of hermeneutics,' 8 5 an interpretive
approach that acknowledges the observer/interpreter as a social be-
ing who reaches truth through a dialectical relationship between the
interpreter and the phenomenon or text.'8 6 Rather than describing
183. Berger and Luckmann describe this phenomenon as reification of socially con-
structed knowledge. See PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF REALIrY 55-83 (1966). See also Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L.
REv. 1151, 1169-70 (1985) ("'Knowledge' is not an adequation of consciousness to the
world. What gets called 'knowledge' is the produced effect of social power institutional-
ized in social representational conventions."); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 758, 794 [hereinafter Peller, Race Consciousness]. See generally UNGER, supra note 178
(discussing the contingency of social arrangements, understandings, and practices that ap-
pear to be necessary and inevitable).
184. Gadamer developed this point by emphasizing how tradition shapes a common
historical consciousness. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECrviSM AND RELATIVISM
129-50 (1983) (discussing Gadamer); see also id. at 142 ("[W]e belong to a tradition before it
belongs to us: tradition, through its sedimentations, has a power which is constantly deter-
mining what we are in the process of becoming. We are always already 'thrown' into a
tradition."); GADAMER, supra note 178. Rorty makes the same point by emphasizing the
shared contingencies of language and conscience. See RoRTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND
SOLIDARrIY, supra note 178, at 3-22. Fish has developed this topic through his thesis of
"interpretive communities." See FISH, TEXT IN THIS CLASS, supra note 180 (subtitled "The
Authority of Interpretive Communities"). See also PatriciaJ. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Re-
constructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 417 (1987) (argu-
ing that one always interprets through an "experiential perspective").
185. The approach here is adopted largely from Gadamerian and post-Gadamerian her-
meneutics, with Rorty being the most relevant post-Gadamerian. See WARNKE, supra note
175, at 139-66. On Gadamerian hermeneutics, see id. at 42-106, 167-71; BERNSTEIN, supra
note 184, at 109-69. See generally GADAMER, supra note 178.
186. Hermeneutics was dramatically redefined in the twentieth century, in large part by
Hans-Georg Gadamer in his seminal work Truth and Method, from its earlier formulation as
a subjectivist methodology of textual exegesis. See WARNKE, supra note 175, at 5-41. It is
from Gadamer that this Article takes much of its understanding of hermeneutics. As Rich-
ard Bernstein explains it:
One of the most important and central claims in Hans-Georg Gadamer's
philosophical hermeneutics is that all understanding involves not only interpreta-
tion, but also application .... [Understanding, interpretation, and application]
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the discovery of an object or truth by detached subjects, hermeneutics
acknowledges that the process of understanding cannot be separated
from the interpreter's language, perspectives, prejudgments and his-
torical context. Knowledge is never final or definitive, but it can be
tested in a practical and effective sense against other perspectives and
contexts. 1 8 7 Hermeneutics entails a dialogic adjudication of truth-
claims that gain reliability as they withstand examination from a
greater variety of social-historical traditions.18 8
On this antifoundationalist-hermeneutic view, the jury is struc-
tured optimally for its task, which is the interpretation of evidence and
propositions in a dialogical adjudication of truth-claims. The jury has
the benefit of several perspectives: a literal conversation among jurors
and, in some sense, an interpretive dialogue between the jurors and
the phenomena or texts8 9 they interpret.'9 ° The deliberative pro-
cess-efforts to persuade fellow jurors and to reconcile competing in-
terpretations-is constrained by the shared assumptions of jurors.
are not three independent activities to be relegated to different subdisciplines,
but rather they are internally related. They are all moments of the single process
of understanding.
... Gadamer... highlight[s] the subtle dialectical and dialogical relation that
exists between the interpreter and what he seeks to interpret. We misconceive
this relation if we think that we are merely subjects or spectators standing over
and against what is objective and what exists an sich, We participate in the works
of art, texts, and tradition that we encounter, and it is only through understand-
ing that their meaning and truth is realized.... But what Gadamer stresses... is
that we do not do this by forgetting or seeking to bracket our own historicity, our
own forestructures, prejudgments, and prejudices.
Richard J. Bernstein, From Hermeneutics to Praxis, in HERMENEUTICS AND PRAXIS, supra note
178, at 272, 274. See also JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 85-94
(1990) (discussing Bernstein and Gadamer); William Eskridge, Gadamer/Statutoiy Interpreta-
tion, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 614-24 (1990) (discussing Gadamer's TRUTH AND METHOD).
187. WARNKE, supra note 175, at 172 ("[1It is precisely in confronting other beliefs and
other presuppositions that we can both see inadequacies of our own and transcend
them.").
188. Id. at 168-71; John D. Caputo, The Thought of Being and the Conversation of Mankind:
The Case of Heidegger and Rorty, in HERMENEUTICS AND PnAxmS, supra note 178, at 248, 251
("Truth as it emerges ... is not the representation of reality but a holistic coherence of
beliefs, settled by an on-going social debate.").
189. See Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1984)
(explaining that human behavior can be viewed as a "text-analogue" and interpreted as
would a written text).
190. Cf Krauss, supra note 52, at 631-32 (noting that the addition of one death penalty
opponent to a capital jury does not necessarily change a verdict from 12-0 to merely 11-1;
rather, that one juror provides a perspective that may persuade others, raising the possibil-
ity that the one juror could change the vote to anywhere from 10-2 to 0-12); Massaro, supra
note 30, at 511 (discussing the advantages of the jury's multiple decisionmakers over a
single judge).
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Even assuming proper use of voir dire, jurors are unbiased only in the
limited and specific sense that they know nothing about the defend-
ant and the other players in the trial (or at least know nothing that the
judge believes will affect their judgment concerning the defendant's
guilt or innocence). Each juror brings to the jury personal history,
prejudices, preunderstandings, and group affiliations.191 The term
"prejudices" here is used as Gadamer defined it-not as something
that can or should be bracketed or overcome so that we may investi-
gate neutrally, nor as something in the narrow, negative sense of prej-
udice as in racial bias. Prejudices are what inevitably constitute us as
beings who always already exist in a particular context, without access
to a transcendent Archimedean point;19 they are "simply the condi-
tions whereby we experience something."9 A juror's ontology pre-
cedes her epistemology: her being-in-the-world, the self she has
191. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 184, at 138; STANLEY FISH, Change, in FISH, WHAT COMES
NATURALLY, supra note 182, at 141, 144-45. Cf Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 183, at
794 (describing black nationalist ideology and positing that the "base of social identity is
that we are, in a sense, thrown into history, with aspects of social reality already structured
to limit some possibilities, while making other ones available"); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and
Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HIARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 179 (1989) (noting that individuals as voters are not fungible but
rather "take with them their political, racial, ethnic and socioeconomic affiliations and
interests").
It is important to note that the number of perspectives or social histories present on
the jury does not necessarily correlate with the number of jurors. If several jurors come
from effectively identical backgrounds with little insight beyond that experience, they col-
lectively represent a single, common perspective. On the other hand, one juror who has
learned from other perspectives or experiences may effectively bring several viewpoints to
the jury's project. For a discussion of this latter possibility, see Mari Matsuda, When theFirst
Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7, 7-10
(1989); Williams, supra note 184, at 411.
192. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 18184, at 127 (quoting Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Univer-
sality of the Hermeneutical Problem, in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 9 (1976)):
It is not so much our judgments as it is our prejudices that constitute our being.
This is a provocative formulation, for I am using it to restore to its rightful place a
positive concept of prejudice that was driven out of our linguistic usage by the
French and the English Enlightenment. It can be shown that the concept of prej-
udice did not originally have the meaning we have attached to it. Prejudices are
not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the truth.
In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense
of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience.
Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions
whereby we experience something-whereby what we encounter says something
to us. This formulation certainly does not mean that we are enclosed within a
wall of prejudices and only let through the narrow portals those things that can
produce a pass saying, "Nothing new will be said here." Instead we welcome just
that guest who promises something new to our curiosity.
Id
193. Id.
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become by experience and context, is prior to and constitutive of the
knowledge she acquires and the judgments at which she arrives.
On this view, then, the jury's social diversity is crucial even to its
task of fact determination. When ajury finds facts, the process entails
subtle and often difficult tasks such as assessing witness demeanor or
the probative value of character evidence, reconciling (or rejecting)
competing and often fragmentary descriptions of a single event, and
otherwise interpreting multiple narratives that claim to inform about
a single question.194 As a result, finding fact is an interpretive en-
deavor,1 1 5 the outcome of which varies with the fact finder. Who finds
facts is just as important to the legal outcome of the trial, therefore, as
who determines moral culpability and community condemnation.
B. Race and Interpretation
Trial lawyers have long assumed that race, as an indication of
group membership and social experience, affects how a juror will in-
terpret events and whether a trial argument will seem persuasive or
commonsensical.' 96 That assumption is why attorneys peremptorily
strike jurors based on racial or ethnic stereotypes;197 it is also what
prompted the Batson doctrine, and why race is one of the few distinc-
194. The hard part of the jury's task in reconstructing historical fact is resolving, on the
basis of partial and often contradictory information, issues such as whether the defendant
acted in self-defense or had permission to withdraw money from certain accounts, or
whether the police officer is really as sure as he claims to be that the man he saw running
in the dark from the crime scene was the defendant, or whether the defendant was moti-
vated by love, money, or racial hate, or whether the defendant's alleged solicitation was a
serious offer, a joke, or a misunderstood statement.
195. In one sense, this observation may seem banal; after all, few would assert that the
jury's fact-finding method could be described as a variant of scientific positivism yielding
an objectively verifiable conclusion. The jury's task is more analogous to analyzing a char-
acter's actions and intentions on the basis of the information in a true crime novel; that is,
the task is comparable to interpreting a book or movie. But even accepting that analogy,
the antifoundationalist position still meets controversy. For example, it is still a respectably
held and ardently defended position among literary theorists that a novel's meaning is the
author's intention and that such intention is objectively and conclusively determinable. See
E.D. HIRSCH, JR., THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION (1976). Juxtaposed to that viewpoint is the
antifoundationalist position that the meaning of a text (whether a novel or an oral narra-
tive given in a courtroom) is not a separate entity from the reader/interpreter; instead,
that person's context and presuppositions inform his conclusions about the text's mean-
ing. When the jury's operation is understood from this latter perspective, the question of
the jury's composition takes on increased importance.
196. See SIMON, supra note 78, at 41; see also MariJ. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical
Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.RL-C.L. L. REv. 323, 323 (1987) [hereinafter Mat-
suda, Looking to the Bottom] (observing that black jurors are "more likely to understand...
that people in power sometimes abuse law to achieve their own ends").
197. See, e.g., Tracy Thompson & Barton Gellman, Barry Jury Set, Testimony Begins Today,
WASH. POST, June 19, 1990, at Al & A10 (noting that Barry's attorney used 10 of his 12
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tions that Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence recog-
nizes as affecting a jury's impartiality.
In recent years, legal scholarship (as well as that in other disci-
plines) has expanded upon this insight and has explored the structure
and implications of racial differences both in legal practice and schol-
arship. For example, Professor Crenshaw has described a "white race
consciousness" that underlies doctrinal and public policy debates.
She argues that, while explicit racism is no longer permissible, what
passes as (and what its practitioners may honestly believe is) a neutral
perspective actually is an unconscious "white norm" that "makes it dif-
ficult-at least for whites-to imagine the world differently.""' As
one example, she argues that in discrimination actions brought by
black women plaintiffs, courts have conceptualized the claims as "hy-
brid" or "compound" claims of race and sex discrimination.199 By
contrast, reverse discrimination claims brought by white males have
not been so described, even though plaintiffs in those cases also have
alleged discrimination based on the combination of their race and
gender.2 0 0  As another example, she points out that courts have
doubted the ability of black women, but not of white women, to repre-
sent a class of female plaintiffs in gender discrimination litigation, as if
white women's race makes them neutral class representatives while
black women's race compromises their ability to represent women of
all races.2 °1
peremptory strikes against white jurors and that the prosecutor used all 7 strikes against
black jurors).
198. Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitima-
tion in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1369-85 (1988); see also T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1080-81 (1991) (arguing
that an assertion of "colorblindness" implicitly contains a white perspective that "puts the
burden on blacks to change ... [and] be seen by whites as 'white'").
199. Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in
THE POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 195, 196 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
200. Id. at 196-97.
That Black women's claims raise the question of compound discrimination while
white males' reverse discrimination claims do not suggests that the notion of
"compound class" is somehow relative or contingent on some presumed norm
.... If that norm is understood to be white male, one can understand how Black
women, being "two steps removed" from being white men, are deemed to be a
compound class while white men are not.
Id.
201. Id. Professor Crenshaw argues:
[In gender discrimination cases,] the absence of a racial referent [when white
women seek to represent all women] does not necessarily mean that the claim
being made is a more inclusive one. A white woman claiming discrimination
against females may be in no better position to represent all women than a Black
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Along the same lines, Professor Matsuda has argued that the ex-
perience and perspectives of people of color in America provide a
"new epistemological source" for examining the structure and impli-
cations of legal doctrine.2 °2 Her argument implies that the common
experience of racial minorities in America alters their shared histori-
cal consciousness so that certain policy arguments and doctrinal op-
tions, unaccepted in mainstream debate, seem persuasive, sensible or
necessary. 20 3 Similarly, Professor Williams has posited the "experien-
tial perspective of blacks" as the explanation for why blacks are more
likely than some others to favor legal rights rhetoric as an empowering
conceptual strategy.204 In support of that thesis, she has observed
more generally that "it really is possible to see things-even the most
concrete things-simultaneously yet differently" and that blacks' and
whites' "qualitatively different experiences of rights" 2 5 explains their di-
vergent assumptions about when the assertion of rights is appropriate
or useful.
Such scholarship2 0 6 explicates a specific and important example
of the general antifoundationalist idea of interpretive bias: one always
understands the world-whether doctrinal issues or everyday human
actions-from some specific locus and personal history. An integral
part of one's history and social position, for Americans, has always
been race. 20 7 Though this scholarship generally has not addressed it-
self to juries, but rather has focused on judicial analysis-legal reason-
ing as opposed to fact finding, logic as opposed to observation-the
insight is highly applicable to the jury's project. Race is a determina-
tive prism through which people interpret social events and under-
stand both human behavior and the law and through which they apply
woman who claims discrimination as a Black female and wants to represent all
females.
202. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 196, at 324-25.
203. See id. at 360.
204. Williams, supra note 184, at 404-05.
205. Id. at 410-12.
206. Crenshaw, Matsuda, and Williams are prominent writers in the scholarly approach
broadly labelled "Critical Race Theory." For representative bibliographies of such scholar-
ship, see Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 183, at 759 nn.4-6 and Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REv. 461 (1993).
207. See Joyce A. Ladner, Tomorrow's Tomorrow: The Black Woman, in THE DEATH OF
WHrrE SocioLoGy 414, 420-21 (Joyce A. Ladner ed., 1973). See generally Sheri L. Johnson,
Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 1016 (1988) (discussing the
Supreme Court's acceptance of racial discrepancies in the American criminal justice
system).
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the latter to the former.2"' This scholarship, and antifoundationalism
generally, presupposes an historicized view of human reason and un-
derstanding. °9 Both repudiate the idea of a universal vantage point
from which all people objectively may discern and understand social
life.210
This position contrasts with much of the scholarship in recent
decades addressing race in American law. The ideological formula-
tion that has developed to counter the nation's history of racism is
premised on the normative assertion that race should not matter in
any respect-that law and social policy should be colorblind.2 11 This
argument proceeds on the basis that ideally our society will transcend
race and achieve the ability to see each other and social life neutrally,
untainted by any racial perspective; race will become as insignificant a
physical trait as eye color.212 Those arguing for race consciousness
generally,21' as well as critical race theorists214 such as Crenshaw, Mat-
suda, and Williams in particular, stand in opposition to the theory of
colorblindness.215
The race-consciousness position yields at least two points that are
important to the discussion of juries. First, race groups, particularly
African Americans, are "distinct social communit[ies]" whose shared
208. See Aleinikoff, supra note 198, at 1066-69; Williams, supra note 184, at 404 n.4;John-
son, supra note 207.
209. See Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 183, at 794.
210. Id.
211. See generally ANoREw KuLL, THE COLORBLIND CONsTrTrnION (1992) (examining the
history of the "colorblind" approach to nondiscrimination in constitutional doctrine).
212. For examples of scholarship arguing that race ideally should be ignored and
treated as insignificant, see Richard Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment:
An Approach to the Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 581 (1977); Morris B. Abram, Affirmative
Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1312 (1986). See also Andrew Kull,
RacialJustice: Trial &y Cross-Section, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 30, 1992, at 17 (criticizing the fair
cross section requirement and efforts to obtain racially diverse jury pools using race con-
scious methods). For an example of this position in the case law, see City of Richmond v. J.
A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
For discussions of this approach to race issues, see Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note
183, at 763-79 (discussing "integrationism" as the dominant understanding of race in law
and social policy generally); Aleinikoff, supra note 198, at 1061-65 (discussing the theory of
"colorblindness" as a "normative principle" that "runs deep" in civil rights law); Alan Free-
man, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MiNN. L. REv. 1049 (1978) (discussing the failure of the "color-
blind approach" in antidiscrimination law to address the underlying condition reinforcing
the inequality between blacks and whites).
213. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 198.
214. See supra notes 198-210 and accompanying text (discussing the work of scholars
usually associated with critical race theory).
215. For a discussion contrasting colorblind "integrationism" with the race-conscious
position, see Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 183, at 791-811.
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history has produced a race identity that marks them as members of a
community "in much the same way that national self-identity operates
to establish the terms of recognition and identity in 'regular' na-
tions."216 Second, the distinctiveness of African Americans as a racial
group increases the odds that blacks who serve on juries will bring to
the juror's task an interpretation of evidence and law different from
that of white jurors.21 7 The Supreme Court acknowledged as much in
Peters v. Kiff2 1 holding that racial differences matter not only for ex-
plicitly racial issues, but also for a broad range of social facts and
issues.219
To return to the examples with which we started, the trials of
Mayor Barry and the officers who beat Rodney King confirm the rele-
vance of race injury decisionmaking. Neither of those trials were ex-
plicitly about race-the government did not accuse the defendants of
race discrimination, the defendants' defenses did not require any re-
verse allegation, and the juries did not have to decide issues of racial
intent or effect. 22 0 The juries did have to grapple with issues that all
juries confront, however: which witness is telling the truth, whether
the defendant acted reasonably, what evidence is credible and persua-
sive. The fact that the defendants in both trials were acquitted (or
avoided conviction by reason of a hung jury) by juries dominated by
members of their own race is not a fact that many, least of all the
216. Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 183, at 792, 793-94.
217. One need not ascribe to racial identity as either monolithic or essentialist in nature
to accept this proposition. See Williams, supra note 184, at 404 & n.4; Aleinikoff, supra note
198, at 1094.
218. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
219. See id. at 503-04 ("[W]e are unwilling to make the assumption that the exclusion of
Negroes has relevance only for issues involving race .... [Their] exclusion deprives the jury
of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that
may be presented."). See also Aleinikoff, supra note 198, at 1086 (making the same point).
220. On the other hand, both trials were widely seen as racially charged: in Barry's case,
a popular black elected official was pursued by white investigators and prosecutors under
the direction of a conservative administration that was unpopular with District residents.
In the Rodney King case, the videotape of white officers beating a black motorist prompted
a lengthy national discussion of racially motivated police brutality. Nevertheless, many
criminal cases have a comparable racial dynamic-either with a defendant and a victim of
different races or with a defendant and the arresting officers of different races. Given the
disproportionate number of black men charged with crimes, see Randolph N. Stone, Crisis
in the Criminal Justice System, 8 HARv. BLACKLErER LJ. 33 (1991), and the continued white
dominance of law enforcement, such scenarios are neither unexpected nor uncommon.
Even when such dynamics are absent, there remains the dynamic between the jurors and
the defendant and witnesses: jurors are assessing a defendant or a witness either of their
own race or of another race and that fact alone raises the salience of the racial dynamic at
least to a minor extent.
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defendants, would claim was meaningless or incidental.22 The race
of the jurors in those cases made a substantive difference in the out-
come of those trials.222
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
A. A Proposal for Changes of Venue
The analysis of this Article raises several practical implications for
legal doctrines affecting juries: that Batson is flawed inasmuch as it
fails to acknowledge how race affects jurors' judgments; that the fair
cross section doctrine should more closely guard the racial diversity of
petit juries and perhaps also should examine the boundaries ofjudi-
cial districts; and that venue changes should take account of the racial
composition of both the original and the alternative venues. On the
latter point, the Rodney King beating case again is instructive: that
trial's venue was transferred from multi-ethnic Los Angeles to
predominantly white Ventura County. In an effort to find jurors who
were less biased by pretrial publicity (a dubious effort given the na-
tional attention that the case, and the beating videotape, attracted),
the jury's racial composition was drastically altered. Even if the new
venue was more neutral in the narrow sense of being less affected by
publicity, the venue change effected a dramatic change in the general
bias resulting from the social character of the community by which
the defendants would be judged. The Sixth Amendment standard of
impartiality was unaffected by the venue change; the Ventura County
jury was "impartial" under Sixth Amendment doctrine. But the collec-
tive prisms of racial history and social experience through which the
jury assessed evidence and applied law shifted significantly with the
venue transfer. Thus, if the venue change increased neutrality in one
respect, it dramatically shifted perspectives in another.2
The Sixth Amendment jurisprudence of jury impartiality, as in-
formed by its venue clause, needs to reclaim its original recognition
that transfers of venue substantively affect the standard and perspec-
tive by which defendants are judged. It would be relatively simple for
221. These racial issues certainly were not incidental to public reaction to those verdicts
and thus to public confidence in the criminal justice system.
222. Empirical data supports the conclusion that race generally affects criminal trials.
SeeJohnson, Black Innocence, supra note 168, at 1619-40 (discussing research that indicates a
widespread tendency among white jurors to convict black defendants in cases in which
white defendants would be acquitted).
223. See Faber, supra note 139, at 141 (noting that a defendant "who is a member of a
minority race may feel that despite considerable publicity-engendered prejudice in the
urban county where the crime took place, his chances for acquittal are worse still in a
distant rural county where the minority population is small").
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change-of-venue doctrine to take account of the racial implications of
a proposed change. 24 Whenever the defendant seeks a venue
change, the court, in selecting an alternative venue, could consider
the racial demographics of alternative venues and could select one
that roughly approximates the original venue.225 Predominantly
white areas often would be relatively easy to match; for venues domi-
nated by racial minorities, the distance to comparable locales may be
greater. But the doctrine could permit the trial judge, in her discre-
tion, to assess the balance and trade-offs between a venue with radi-
cally different racial demographics and one that is so distant as to
impose logistical burdens on the conduct of the trial. A multi-factor
analysis, on the model of federal forum non conveniens doctrine, would
be appropriate: the trial court, in selecting an alternative venue,
could consider (a) the amount of change in racial demographics, (b)
the distance to the new venue and the inconvenience or expense that
would be imposed on the parties, and (c) the likelihood that the new
venue would reduce the bias that infects the original locale. 226 Fur-
thermore, the doctrine might allow the defendant to exercise his
venue waiver after the trial judge has selected an alternative venue,
thereby allowing the defendant to weigh the impartiality gains of a
224. In the wake of the William Lozano trial, see supra note 10, Florida enacted a statute
doing exactly this. See 1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 93-225 (West). This new approach
should not open a Pandora's box of factors to consider in selecting alternative venues.
Besides race and ethnicity, only gender has been granted strong constitutional recognition
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Fortunately, gender demographics are
roughly the same in all venues, so that factor is of no concern. Although myriad other
factors affect juror decisionmaking, including economic class, occupation, and religion,
venue doctrine nevertheless could defensibly draw the line at protecting only racial or
ethnic demographics. The original venue may have many farmers or factory workers while
the alternative may have more white-collar professionals, but that does not mean a defend-
ant is entitled to constitutional or statutory protection of that demographic mix. As a
policy matter, opening the venue calculation to factors other than race likely would make
it prohibitively complicated.
225. A Florida court did exactly this in transferring the venue of the William Lozano
trial from Orlando to Tallahassee. See supra note 10.
In some cases, this will be easy: Barry's trial, for instance, might have been transferred
to Baltimore, Maryland, a forty-minute drive north, or at least to Prince George's County,
Maryland, which has a substantial African American population. The problem of federal
districts that encompass large areas of a state (or perhaps even an entire state) would have
to be worked out, probably by picking juries from divisions within districts, as many dis-
tricts currently do. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (1988) (permitting federal judicial districts to
operate separate jury selection plans "for each division or combination of divisions within a
judicial district").
226. Florida's statute takes a simpler approach, mandating that the trial judge give pri-
ority to the venue with demographics that most closely match the original. See 1993 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. ch. 93-225 (West).
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new venue against the disadvantages of defending in a distant
forum.
2 2 7
Such a rule takes seriously the insights about the nature of impar-
tiality that the fair cross section requirement's jurisprudence provides.
If no jury is impartial in terms of its racial perspective-if competing
perspectives are merely different, but not more or less objective-
then the law needs to recognize this understanding of impartiality.
Once we acknowledge that race makes a difference in jury impartial-
ity, the only remaining standard by which to measure impartiality (in
the sense of interpretive bias or racial perspective) is the
demographics of the venue that the defendant initially "chose" by
committing the alleged criminal acts in that venue.
228
B. Conclusion
The centrality of race and social history to jury impartiality points
toward other projects of doctrinal revision as well. It emphasizes the
227. See generally Faber, supra note 139 (arguing that defendants should be allowed to
specify the venue to which their case is transferred).
228. This regime has the additional quality of lessening defendants' opportunities to
manipulate transfer of venue in highly publicized cases. Whenever a change of venue
would be granted, defendants have the choice of whether or not to request it. They will
request a change if they believe the move benefits them, but in making that assessment
they calculate not only the prejudice arising from pretrial publicity but also the
demographics of the likely new venue. Mayor Barry chose not to change venue, despite
prejudicial publicity, because he calculated (correctly) that the favorable demographics of
the original venue outweighed any benefit he could gain from a transfer. The defendants
in the King beating case, on the other hand, sought a transfer in hopes of being tried in a
largely white, suburban venue. Adjusting venue transfer doctrine as discussed herein to
take account of racial demographics will remove many of defendants' opportunities to
make such calculations.
Reducing opportunities for changing racial demographics through venue changes
may or may not be a normative improvement. In the few cases in which it applies, change
of venue doctrine gives defendants a tool with which to counter the government's existing
ability to manipulate venue by choosing the locale in which it has the advantage when
several venues are available (as is the case under many federal criminal statutes). See
United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 278 (1944) ("While it might facilitate the Govern-
ment's prosecution in a case like this to have its witnesses near the place of trial, this must
be balanced against the inconvenience of transporting the Government's witnesses to trial
... [and] the serious hardship of defending prosecutions in places remote from home
... ."); Multi-Venue, supra note 55, at 401-03 (1962) (discussing the practice of Congress to
designate various federal crimes as "continuing offenses," thereby allowing for prosecution
in multiple districts). The number of cases in which these two situations coincide-that is,
the case is brought under a statute that has permitted the prosecution to select an inconve-
nient forum, but the venue is somehow prejudiced so that the defendant would be entitled
to a venue change-is undoubtedly small. Moreover, the defendant could be empowered
by a rule of procedure (which could apply whether or not change-of-venue doctrine is
altered from its current formulation) allowing the waiver of her venue right to be condi-
tional on transfer to an alternative district she selects.
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need to reexamine the compromise that Sixth Amendment doctrine
has struck regarding petit juries, forgoing a guarantee of their repre-
sentativeness as a concession to administrative costs. Options exist for
moving closer to a guarantee of diverse petit juries; courts and schol-
ars need to work toward their formulation.229 Courts and policymak-
ers also need to consider the feasibility of revising judicial districts in
order to maximize diversity and should reexamine sources and meth-
ods for composing juror lists as well as grounds for granting hardship
excuses to jurors, both of which contribute to unrepresentative
juries.23 0
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence contains the unavoidable ten-
sions and inconsistencies of doctrines that must give content to con-
troverted and difficult concepts such as the nature of impartiality and
the salience of race. Those tensions are largely inevitable when tenta-
tive conclusions about these concepts must serve as the premises for
policy and practice. Some of those tensions (identified by persuasive
empirical research) are unpleasant to contemplate-such as the fact
that whites are less likely to render favorable judgment upon a black
defendant.21  Others invite changes that are infeasible to imple-
ment-such as requiring equitable representation of a community on
every petit jury.
Implicit in the structure of the fair cross section doctrine, how-
ever, is a productive understanding of how racial issues should inform
229. See Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 17, at 1585-87. One of those options
might be to eliminate peremptory strikes, either for the prosecution only or for all parties.
See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 30 (arguing that eliminating the state's use of peremptory
challenges would better protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to ajury composed
of at least some of his peers).
230. See Martin Howard Levin, The Juyy in a Criminal Case: Obstacles to Impartiality, 24
CRiM. L. BuLL. 492, 498 (1988) (stating that, for many reasons, various types ofjurors are
excused or avoid jury service, so thatjuries "frequently do[ ] not reflect the distribution of
attitudes, values and biases in the general community"); Race and the Criminal Process, supra
note 17, at 1561-81.
231. See Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 117, at 1560.
Although empirical evidence is fairly conclusive that all-white or predominantly white
juries work to the real disadvantage of minority defendants, the discomfort some may have
with this acknowledgement arises in large part because of how we have constructed the
ideas of impartiality and objectivity. The antifoundationalist position provides a descriptive
basis for understanding these ideas; antifoundationalism explains the unjust result in a
manner less accusatory to the jurors. Because there is no comprehension of trial evidence
separate from the jurors' contextual interpretation or understanding of it, and because
that understanding is always filtered through the juror's cultural interpretive biases,
neither blacks nor whites as a group are necessarily being racist in the sense of acting in
bad faith or ignoring evidence. The empirical trend arises instead from the nondiversifica-
tion of the jury panels and the juries' failure to engage in an exchange of ideas and
perspectives.
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the judicial understanding of impartiality. Impartiality is more than
an absence of pretrial information about a case and a genuine willing-
ness to evaluate evidence fairly. The Sixth Amendment's fair cross
section and venue doctrines have each recognized that jury impartial-
ity cannot be separated from the social history of each juror, nor from
the social context into which jurors collectively are thrown. The Bat-
son doctrine and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence each acknowledge
that, in the United States, racial identity cannot be separated from
social history, nor from the interracial narratives that dominate Amer-
ican criminal law. These observations do not point toward any easy or
obvious reconstructive projects for the law of juries. But they merit
attention, and they can productively inform future decisions on venue
and jury selection and composition.
